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ABSTRACT 
 
While there is considerable scholarship on the due diligence defense 
of lead underwriters in defective corporate securities offerings, there 
is surprisingly little analysis of the due diligence defense of non-
managing underwriters.  This article challenges the common 
perception that lead and non-managing underwriters necessarily 
“sink or swim” together for purposes of due diligence.  An analysis 
of the statutory structure of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 
reveals that non-managing underwriters are not inextricably tethered 
to the lead.  Rather, non-managing underwriters who actively 
question the lead’s due diligence investigation should be able to meet 
their own affirmative defense even when the lead ultimately fails to 
meet its burden.  Moreover, despite protestations from some in the 
investment banking community, it is also clear that to succeed in 
their separate affirmative defense, non-managing underwriters 
cannot simply be passive participants.  To meet their separate 
defense, they must actively supervise the lead’s investigation of the 
financial health of the corporate issuer.  Finally, this article addresses 
some of the practical issues involved in non-managing underwriters 
monitoring the lead underwriter’s investigation. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If securities lawyers were asked to describe the due diligence role 
of non-managing underwriters in securities offerings, many would 
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probably admit that, while they are well versed in the responsibilities of 
lead underwriters, they have not focused on the role of non-managing 
underwriters.  If pressed, the lawyers might add some pithy comment 
such as non-managers will “sink or swim” with the lead underwriter’s 
investigation.1  Beyond that helpful tidbit, however, it is unlikely that the 
lawyers would have at the ready any further guidance.  While there is 
considerable practitioner and academic commentary on the due diligence 
role of underwriters in corporate securities offerings, that scholarship 
focuses almost exclusively on the responsibilities of lead underwriters.2  
This article, by contrast, analyzes the role of non-managing underwriters 
(“NMUs”)3
 
 1. The shorthand term “sink or swim” appears fairly regularly in guidelines on 
due diligence.  See e.g., Jack C. Auspitz & Susan E. Quinn, Litigators’ View of Due 
Diligence, 1348 PLI/CORP. 107, at 151 (2003); J. William Hicks, Misleading 
Registration Statements:  Section 11, 17 CIVIL LIABILITIES:  ENFORCEMENT AND LITIG. § 
4:106 (2009). 
  in relation to the lead and challenges the perception that 
 2. See, e.g., William F. Alderman, Due Diligence in the Post-Enron Era:  A 
Litigator’s Practical Tips on Mitigating Underwriter Risk, 1746 PLI/CORP. 87 (2009); 
Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Underwriters’ 
Continuous Due Diligence After WorldCom, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2001, 2012 (2009); 
Jonathan K. Youngwood, Due Diligence as a Defense in Securities Litigation, 1746 
PLI/CORP. 57, 67–69 (2009); William J. Whelan, III, Civil Liabilities, 1734 PLI/CORP. 
635, 640–41 (2009); 6 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 13:13, at 1–3 
(2d ed. 2009).  Very generally, an underwriter serves as a middle man.  The underwriter 
buys securities from the corporate issuer and “resells them to the public, or performs 
some act . . . that facilitates the issuer’s distribution.”  In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 346 
F. Supp. 2d  628, 662 (S.D.N.Y.  2004).  Positioning underwriters between corporate 
issuers and prospective investors is designed to protect the investors from defective 
offerings.  Id.  As the court in WorldCom explained, the statutory structure envisions 
that underwriters will serve “as ‘the first line of defense’ with respect to material 
misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements.” Id. 
 3. The term non-managing underwriter is borrowed from In re ZZZZ Best Sec. 
Litig. (ZZZZ Best I), 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).  In this article, the term “non-
managing underwriters” refers to all of the underwriters named in the registration 
statement as participating in the securities offering other than the lead underwriter.  This 
article also borrows the moniker “NMU” for non-managing underwriters from the 
opinion in ZZZZ Best I.  Id.  The ZZZZ Best I court explained that it used the term non-
managing underwriters solely as an effective and easy term of reference.  Id.  Similarly, 
this article uses the term non-managing underwriter as a useful way of referring to all 
the various non-lead participating underwriters.  There are, of course, various other 
terms routinely used to refer to non-managing underwriters who participate in an 
underwriting syndicate such as non-lead underwriters and participating underwriters. 
See Leahy, supra note 2, at 2012.  There are also varying terms used to refer to the lead 
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NMUs are powerless to protect themselves from the lead’s failure. It 
also rejects the view that NMUs need not do anything to meet their 
affirmative defense of due diligence found in Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act” or “1933 Act”).4
There are in general four possible relationships between lead 
underwriters and NMUs.  In two scenarios, the lead and the NMU 
succeed or fail together.  In the other two they diverge.  The first 
scenario, referred to here as “Lead fails/NMU fails,” arises when the 
lead underwriter failed its due diligence investigation and the NMU did 
nothing. This scenario is the one famously described in Escot v. 
BarChris Construction Corporation.
 
5 Courts and scholars generally 
agree that in this scenario all the underwriters fail to meet their 
affirmative due diligence defense.6
The second scenario where the underwriters are in concert is on the 
opposite end of the spectrum.  In this scenario, referred to as “Lead 
wins/NMU wins,” the lead met its due diligence affirmative defense and 
the NMU proved that it monitored and questioned the lead’s 
 
 
underwriter including lead manager, book runner, or book running manager.  Id. 
Typically, public securities offerings are underwritten by not just one underwriter, but 
by an underwriting syndicate comprised of lead underwriters and non-managing 
underwriters.  Id. 
 4. The United States Code cite for the Securities Act of 1933  is 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77mm.  The specific United States Code cite for § 11 of the Securities Act is 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k.  The custom in securities law is to refer to the statutory section as enacted and 
published in the Statutes at Large, not the sections as codified in the United States 
Code.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)).  Accordingly, this article refers to § 11 of 
the Securities Act as § 11.  Similarly, this article refers to provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act (“Exchange Act” or “1934 Act”) in the text of the article by reference to 
sections of the Exchange Act.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Pub. L. No. 
73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo). 
 5.  283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 6.  See Youngwood, supra note 2, at 68.  “If a court concludes that the lead 
underwriter conducted an insufficient investigation, and the non-managing underwriters 
did nothing but rely upon the lead underwriter, the non-managing underwriters will be 
held liable as well.”  Id.  But see Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae The Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association in Opposition to Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment in In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master File No. 05 Civ. 
8626, at 5 (GEL), available at http://www.sifma.org/Issues/item.aspx?id=1502 (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2010) [hereinafter SIFMA Refco Amicus].  The SIFMA amicus would 
absolve the NMUs of responsibility in Lead fails/NMU does nothing scenarios.  Id.  
Such a position is a significant departure from current law. 
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investigation.  In this scenario, even though the registration statement is 
defective, both the lead and the NMU would be able to meet their 
respective affirmative due diligence defenses.7
The two remaining scenarios arise when the lead and the NMU are 
no longer in concert.  The first of these split scenarios, the “Lead 
fails/NMU wins” case, arises when the lead failed its due diligence 
investigation but the NMU can demonstrate that it had appropriately 
questioned the lead’s investigation.  This could happen, for example, 
where problems with the issuer were well hidden or where the lead was 
in collusion with the issuer.  This article explains that an accurate 
reading of Section 11 supports an NMU’s affirmative defense in these 
scenarios even though the lead failed to establish its own defense.  Thus, 
this article recommends that NMUs should monitor the lead’s 
investigation in all public offerings.  By doing so, NMUs protect 
themselves even if the lead should fail. 
 
The last scenario, the “Lead wins/NMU fails” case, arises when the 
lead is able to demonstrate sufficient due diligence but the NMU did 
nothing.  Although some commentators and some cases suggest that the 
NMU’s affirmative due diligence defense should succeed in these 
scenarios, a careful reading of the statute and its legislative history 
indicates that such a view is incorrect.  Rather, this article posits that 
even when the lead meets its due diligence burdens, the NMUs do not 
meet their affirmative defense unless they monitored the lead. 
Part II of this article demonstrates that an analysis of the role of 
NMUs in securities offerings is not just theoretical.  This section 
discusses an amicus brief recently filed by the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”)—a lobbying group for the 
financial industry—asserting that a subset of NMUs8
 
 7. The NMU would be able to meet its defense if it properly supervised the due 
diligence of its delegate the lead.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
  could meet their 
Section 11 due diligence defense without any independent investigation 
 8. Within an underwriting syndicate there are often several “tiers” of underwriters 
and the various underwriting firms in the syndicate often vie for position in the higher 
tiers.  Leahy, supra note 2, at 2058.  Within a syndicate, the term “junior underwriters” 
sometimes refers to all the underwriters except for the lead underwriters and sometimes 
the term is used to refer to only the lowest tier in the syndicate.  Id. at 2013.  This article 
does not need to differentiate among the various tiers.  Nor does this article need to 
spend any time parsing through the various terms because, as discussed below, the due 
diligence analysis applies to all the non-managing underwriters regardless of their 
labels.  See infra Part II. 
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or any monitoring of the due diligence investigation performed by the 
lead underwriters.9
Part III of this article analyzes the due diligence required of 
underwriters under both the plain language of Section 11 and its 
legislative history.  This analysis reveals that the language of due 
diligence in Section 11 employs terms borrowed from the common law 
of trusts. 
  This part also discusses what appear to be typical 
practices by NMUs and briefly describes the parameters of Section 11. 
Accordingly, Part IV then analyzes trust law for guidance on the 
proper scope of trustee delegation and applies those trustee delegation 
concepts in the context of delegation by NMUs. 
 
 9.  See SIFMA Refco Amicus, supra note 6, at 5.  See infra Part III as to why those 
factors are insufficient.  The salient facts of Refco’s registered offering problem can be 
summarized as follows.  On August 16, 2005, Refco Inc. announced the completion of 
its initial public offering.  United States Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Form 8-K, Refco Inc., 
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1321746/000110465905039844/a05-
14370_48k.htm (Aug. 16, 2005).  The offering was for $583 million.  John C. Coffee 
Jr., Securities Law:  The Refco Meltdown, 28 NAT’L L.J. 9, 4 (2005).  Approximately 
two months later, on October 10, 2005, Refco disclosed that “it had discovered through 
an internal review a receivable owed to the Company by an entity controlled by Phillip 
R. Bennett, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors, in the 
amount of approximately $430 million . . . which may have been uncollectible.”  See 
Press Release, SEC, Refco Announces Undisclosed Affiliate Transaction (Oct. 10, 2005) 
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1321746/000110465905048112/a05-
17426_1ex99d1.htm.  One week after the public disclosure, on October 17, 2005, Refco 
filed for bankruptcy and Phillip Bennett was indicted for various fraudulent actions.  
Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, U.S. Indicts 
Former Owner of Refco and Expands Charges in Refco Fraud (Jan. 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January07/bennetttrosten- 
grantrefcoS3indictmentpr.pdf.  The court determined that Refco had been fraudulently 
concealing “hundreds of millions in uncollectible trading losses and other operating 
expenses.”  Kirshner v. KPMG LLP (Kirschner II), 590 F.3d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2009).  
The process of concealing these losses was effected by a using a complicated system of 
subsidiaries and third party loans to make it appear as if Refco had significantly more 
assets than liabilities, which was not the case.  Id.  The purchasers of the securities 
offered pursuant to Refco’s public offering sued the underwriters, among others, under 
§ 11.  Id.  In addition, the SEC filed an action against an individual who was a senior 
partner at Refco’s outside counsel, and the Justice Department brought concurrent 
criminal charges.  SEC v. Collins, 07 CV 11343, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010).  
The partner eventually reached a plea agreement.  Id.  The investors also tried to bring a 
private claim for aiding and abetting against outside counsel as a group, which was 
dismissed on the grounds that a private right of action for aiding and abetting did not 
exist.  In re Refco Sec. Litig. (Refco III), 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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Part V examines the relatively few cases discussing the role of 
NMUs in registered offerings.  It also reviews how the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has addressed the due diligence 
responsibilities of underwriters over the years.  It finds that the SEC 
requires at least some monitoring of the lead by the NMUs. 
Part VI addresses some of the practical issues in terms of timing 
and costs involved in requiring NMUs to conduct some supervision of 
their delegates in order to earn their due diligence defenses.  This part 
also discusses some of the ethical issues involving potential conflicts for 
the attorneys involved.  Finally, the article concludes that all 
underwriters, including NMUs, must take responsibility.  If NMUs do 
not investigate themselves, they must monitor those who do in order to 
satisfy their burden for a due diligence defense.  Alternatively, NMUs 
should recast their role in a way that removes false comfort to 
purchasers who may believe that the firms have been involved in due 
diligence.  The article ends with the standard admonition to the industry 
to refrain from pushing the envelope too far.10
 
 
II. NON-MANAGING UNDERWRITERS’ DUE DILIGENCE PRACTICES  
AND DESCRIPTION OF SECTION 11 
This section first describes current characterizations of the due 
diligence activities of NMUs.  Then, in order to put the NMUs’ 
responsibilities in context, this section briefly describes the parameters 
of Section 11. 
A. CURRENT DUE DILIGENCE PRACTICES BY NMUS:  
JUST SIT THERE AND LOOK PRETTY 
One reason the role of NMUs in due diligence has remained 
relatively unexplored may be that commentators assumed that 
participating NMUs were at least minimally questioning and reviewing 
the work of the lead underwriter.11
 
 10. In consideration to the readers, this author refrained from using the clichéd “pig 
theory.” 
  It appears, however, that extreme 
passivity by NMUs may actually be the norm.  SIFMA’s recent amicus 
 11. Another reason for confusion on the appropriate due diligence role of NMUs 
may stem from an overreliance by commentators on dicta in a handful of cases.  See 
infra Part IV. 
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brief filed in litigation involving now-bankrupt Refco Inc. takes the 
position that a tier of NMUs could meet their Section 11 due diligence 
defense without questioning the due diligence investigation performed 
by the lead underwriters.12
SIFMA’s argument on behalf of passive NMUs appears to rest 
primarily on reliance on reputational factors.
 
13  The crux of the claim is 
that NMUs can meet their due diligence burden in a registered offering 
by relying on the reputation of, and their previous experiences with, the 
lead underwriters and underwriters’ counsel.14  Under this view, the 
passive NMUs do not need to undertake even minimal monitoring of the 
lead underwriter’s due diligence activities with regard to the particular 
issuer or the actual securities offered in the upcoming registration 
statement.15
Unfortunately, reputational-based factors ring particularly hollow in 
light of recent analytical and empirical studies demonstrating the failures 
of gatekeepers, particularly auditors and underwriters, in registered 
offerings.  Professor Coffee has been particularly prolific in his 
gatekeeper scholarship and has questioned whether the term 
“gatekeeper” is apt.
 
16  Other scholars have been similarly dismissive of 
reliance on the reputation of gatekeepers.17  According to Professor 
Partnoy, “Professor Coffee and others have demonstrated that reputation 
alone is a suboptimal constraint.”18  Both Professor Coffee and Professor 
Partnoy have envisioned replacing the current system of due diligence 
with some variant of a modified strict liability system in which 
gatekeepers ensure the reliability of the work they oversee.19
 
 12. See SIFMA Refco Amicus, supra note 6, at 5; see also infra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
  
Alternatively, Professor Fox, an influential scholar in corporate 
 13. SIFMA Refco Amicus, supra note 6, at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:  The Challenge 
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); John C. Coffee, A Section 
11 Safe Harbor, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 2005, at 5 col.1; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding 
Enron:  “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002). 
 17. See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor 
Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365 (2004). 
 18. Id. at 375. 
 19. See Coffee , supra note 16, at 349-351; Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the 
Gatekeepers?:  A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
491 (2001). 
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governance and civil liability, has argued for replacing the public 
offering gatekeeper with an external “certifying entity.”20  Until these 
reforms take hold, it is important to recognize that recent studies reveal 
that gatekeepers’ reputational concerns have not served as sufficient 
incentives for underwriters to screen and police issuers.21  Rather, recent 
empirical studies suggest that “underwriters’ concerns about generating 
revenues appear to override their concerns about reputation.”22
The justification for the total delegation position appears to be that 
it conforms to current industry practice.  According to SIFMA, it is 
typical for certain NMUs to delegate all investigative duties to the lead 
underwriter and not to monitor the delegate.
 
23  Moreover, the amicus 
suggests that certain underwriters customarily agree, simply in order to 
be invited to join the syndicate, to give up even minimal abilities to 
review the work of the lead underwriters.24  While SIFMA’s amicus 
particularly refers to junior underwriters,25
 
 20. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
237, 240 (2009). 
 Section 11 does not 
 21. Id. 
 22. Anup Agrawal & Tommy Cooper, Accounting Scandals in IPO Firms:  Do 
Underwriters and VCs Help? 39 (European Fin. Ass’n, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009782.  In their interesting recent 
empirical study, Professors Agrawal and Cooper come to the troubling conclusion that 
an IPO issuer was actually more likely to have to issue a financial restatement to correct 
violations of generally accepted accounting principles after its IPO, if the lead 
investment bank underwriter for the IPO was one with a supposedly better reputation 
than other investment banks.  Id.  The authors explain that bulge-bracket banks appear, 
perhaps because of their size and power, to be able to tolerate “reputational risks posed 
by low-quality issuers” without effect.  Id.  They note, for example, that Goldman Sachs 
has been “referred to as the ‘Teflon’ investment bank because its reputation has not 
suffered from its involvement in various scandals over the past decade.”  Id. at 9. 
 23. See infra Part IV.  The SIFMA amicus uses the term lead underwriters or lead 
managers to refer to the “firms that have been working for some time with the issuer, 
and have developed a working relationship with the issuer.”  SIFMA Refco Amicus, 
supra note 6, at 3.  The amicus notes that generally, it is the lead managers who decide 
“whether and when to invite other securities firms to join the syndicate as co-
managers.”  Id.  The amicus also explains that the lead managers also “retain counsel to 
act for all the underwriters.”  Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  Similarly, the underwriter defendants in Refco use the term “junior 
underwriters” to mean a subset of NMUs.  Underwriters’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to 
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. in In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master File No. 05 Civ. 
8626, at 4 (GEL) [hereinafter Underwriters’ Memorandum in Opposition].  The term 
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distinguish among the various tiers of participating underwriters.26
This article recognizes that NMUs in a syndicate
  
Accordingly, this article analyzes the due diligence responsibilities of 
non-managing participating underwriters. 
27 routinely cede 
the bulk of the due diligence investigation to the lead underwriters, so 
that the work is not duplicative.28
While concerns with this system of total delegation by NMUs to 
lead underwriters could be analyzed through the prism of Refco, 
commentators have already explored the spectacular Refco collapse, 
including the embarrassing failures of the various underwriters as 
gatekeepers.
  Such delegation to the lead is neither 
new nor controversial and, in fact, is logical and prudent.  What is 
troubling, however, and where this article parts ways with SIFMA’s 
characterization of current industry practice, is for NMUs to cede the 
ability to supervise their delegate—a step that is neither logical nor 
prudent. 
29
 
“junior underwriter” is sometimes used as shorthand to refer to “small to mid-size 
investment firms, each offering investment banking and underwriting services through 
their capital markets division.”  Id.  The Underwriters’ Memorandum in Opposition 
further notes that “IPO underwriting syndicates usually consists of lead managers, co-
managers, and junior underwriters, each of which serve different roles and have 
different responsibilities.”  Id. at 5.  According to the Underwriters’ Memorandum in 
Opposition, “[j]unior underwriters are typically not invited into an IPO underwriting 
syndicate until the final days before the shares are priced and distributed, after the 
preliminary prospectus has been distributed and the marketing of the IPO has begun.”  
Id.  While the timing of junior underwriters joining the syndicate may differ from the 
timing of other non-lead participants joining, § 11makes no substantive distinction 
among non-lead participating firms for purposes of due diligence.  Id. 
  Thus, this article does not focus on the Refco litigation or 
 26. Id. 
 27. See In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985).  The 
court describes a typical underwriting syndicate for a public offering as follows: 
The underwriters, or members of the syndicate, enter into an agreement commonly 
referred to as an agreement among underwriters. The managing or lead 
underwriters are given authority to act on behalf of all syndicate members with 
respect to underwriting the issue and getting it to market.  They are responsible for 
negotiating and contracting with the issuer, preparing the registration statement 
and participating in the “due diligence” meeting.  The warranties and 
representations of the company contained in the agreement between the 
underwriters and the issuer run to all members of the syndicate; the obligations of 
the syndicate to the company are shared by all its members. 
Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Emily Thornton, Refco:  The Reckoning, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005, 
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the amicus SIFMA filed in the case.  Rather, this piece solely uses the 
Refco litigation and SIFMA’s amicus as a springboard to explore the 
legal basis for the total delegation position.30
Admittedly, the amicus also tees up a number of broader questions 
regarding the role of all underwriters, not just NMUs.  First, is due 
diligence a quaint relic that can be disregarded with impunity?  Or, is 
due diligence a remaining justification for paying underwriters their 
hefty gatekeeper prices?
 
31  Second, if some underwriters do not serve 
as true gatekeepers, because they perform no evaluative underwriting 
functions, is it misleading to refer to them as underwriters and tout 
their reputations in an offering?  In other words, is it illusory to list a 
firm who performs no due diligence at all as an “underwriter” in an 
offering?32
Third, if underwriters complain that they have trouble performing 
due diligence because issuers move too quickly, is the answer that they 
should find creative ways to perform under pressure?  Finally, when 
underwriters argue that they cannot be expected to uncover fraud 
because it is too well hidden, is the answer that they should give up and 
attempt to convince courts to ignore the existing statutory framework?
 
33
 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958095.htm.  
“In theory, Wall Street has gatekeepers—the major investment banks—to scrutinize 
dubious deals.  But in practice, the banks are hungry for fees and sometimes appear to 
take this critical job more lightly than the public expects.”  Id.  See generally Coffee, 
Refco Meltdown, supra note 9. 
  
 30. SIFMA Refco Amicus, supra note 6, at 2-3.  According to the SIFMA Refco 
amicus brief, junior underwriters can meet their affirmative defense of due diligence 
without any review at all of the due diligence performed by the lead underwriters.  The 
brief provides that “it [is] sufficient for purposes of the Section 11 due diligence 
defense for [the junior underwriters] to rely on the reputations of the lead underwriters 
and underwriters’ counsel and on their experience in dealing with the lead underwriters 
and counsel in prior transactions.”  Id. 
 31. Underwriting fees in registered public offerings can be quite substantial.  
Reports estimate that in initial public offerings, for example, underwriters typically 
obtain commissions of “between four to ten percent of gross offering proceeds.”  
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
409, 435 (2008).  Moreover, issuers typically pay the underwriters’ legal, due diligence, 
and marketing expenses of the offering.  Id. 
    32.    By analogy, in Walk-In Medical Ctrs. Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., the court 
found it illusory to describe an offering as a firm commitment underwriting when the 
underwriters “were entitled to terminate the agreement due to any unfavorable market 
decline.”  818 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 33. Several articles analyzing the lead underwriters’ role in modern offerings call 
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In other words, are underwriters underperforming? All of these questions 
are logically raised when underwriters, or their surrogates, advocate 
extreme positions such as the one proffered by SIFMA in its amicus 
brief in the Refco litigation.  One way to ponder these bigger questions is 
to return to basic principles regarding underwriters.  Careful review of 
those principles shows that the total delegation position flies in the face 
of the plain language of Section 11, its legislative history, and its 
interpretations in SEC releases and cases.34
B. STRUCTURE OF SECTION 11 AND UNDERWRITERS: A UNIQUE POSITION 
 
Before turning to the role of NMUs in due diligence, it is helpful to 
describe briefly the structure of Section 11 and its requirements.  Section 
11 is a meticulously crafted private liability statute.  It differs from other 
federal securities statutes where Congress left the specifics to be fleshed 
out by the SEC or the courts.35
Section 11 provides a private right of action under certain carefully 
prescribed conditions.  The plain language of Section 11 denotes 
precisely who has the right to bring a suit, which violations are 
covered, lists the possible defendants, articulates various affirmative 
 
 
for legislative changes.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?:  The 
Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195, 1211 
(1997).  As Judge Cote explained in WorldCom, these calls for changing the statute 
serve to emphasize that the existing statutory structure creates certain responsibilities 
for underwriters and that deviations from these responsibilities would require legislative 
changes.  See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  “Implicit in these calls for a legislative change is the recognition that current 
law continues to place a burden upon an underwriter to conduct a reasonable 
investigation . . .”  Id.  An interesting recent empirical study argues that in “an era of 
high-profile corporate scandals, the ability of issuers to side-step due diligence could 
have severe consequences for investors.”  Don M. Autore et al., Accelerated Equity 
Offerings and Firm Quality 2 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265148.  
The authors examined recent shelf equity offerings and found that higher quality issuers 
signaled their quality to the market by allowing more time for underwriters to perform 
due diligence (by using bookbuilt shelf offers) than lower quality issuers who instead 
used accelerated shelf offers that limited time for underwriter due diligence to prevent 
exposure of their true quality.  Id. at 3. 
 34. See infra Part V. 
 35. Less precise statutes may be deliberately bare bones to allow courts to handle 
future and unforeseen schemes that violate the general prohibitions and purposes of the 
statute.  In addition, less specific statutes may be political compromises where Congress 
was willing to allow the relevant administrative agencies or the courts to fill in the gaps. 
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defenses that may be raised, and even addresses damages.36
Because of the detail provided in the statute, the substantive legal 
parameters of Section 11 are generally well established.  Although 
complaints involving Section 11 are filed each year, the cases typically 
do not involve challenges to the substantive legal parameters of the 
statute.  Rather, Section 11 cases are often confined to factual questions, 
such as whether, in a particular case, a registration statement actually 
contains a material misstatement or omits a material fact.  Other Section 
11 cases involve procedural issues, such as whether the plaintiff or 
defendant’s class should be certified,
 
37 or whether a complaint alleging 
a Section 11 violation is so interwoven with a fraud claim that it “sounds 
in fraud,” thereby triggering the higher pleading requirements of 9(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.38
Perhaps the most significant limitation for investors attempting to 
pursue a claim under Section 11 is that Congress confined Section 11 
liability to securities purchased pursuant to a defective registered public 
offering.
  Accordingly, the substantive 
parameters of Section 11 can be summarized without difficulty. 
39
 
 36. Congress’ desire for certainty in drafting such a detailed statute could be 
criticized for failing to allow flexibility in the law to address future developments.  
These criticisms are tempered, however, by other statutes allowing flexibility and, of 
course, by the ability of Congress to repeal or modify the statute, and detail has not, so 
far, made it irrelevant or inapposite. 
  Thus, an investor who purchased securities through a 
 37. See, e.g., In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re 
Computer Memories Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 675 (N.D. Cal. 1986); discussion infra 
Section IV. 
 38. The Eighth Circuit in In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig. reasoned that “Rule 
9(b) does not apply to claims under § 11 of the Securities Act, because proof of fraud or 
mistake is not a prerequisite to establishing liability under § 11.” 130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th 
Cir. 1997).  Other circuits, however, have applied Rule 9(b) to § 11 actions where there 
are allegations of fraud interwoven in the complaint.  In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 
F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996).  The Court in In re Stac Electronics found that “the 
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to claims brought under § 11 when . . . 
they are grounded in fraud.”  Id. at 1405-06.  See also ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, 
Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 68 (1st Cir. 2008); Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 
1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 39. A person who buys pursuant to a defective registration statement can be a 
plaintiff.  Securities Act § 11(a), (e).  There is no reliance requirement imposed on the 
plaintiff unless the plaintiff purchased the securities after the issuer made available an 
earnings statement that covered at least a year beginning after the effective date of the 
registration statement.  Id.  Moreover, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving 
causation or damages in a § 11 case.  Id. 
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defective private non-registered offering cannot make a Section 11 
claim.40  Moreover, only purchasers who can trace their securities 
directly to the defective registration statement can make a claim.41
 
 40. Private offerings have become more attractive since the SEC’s easing of resale 
restrictions for buyers.  Rule 144, for example, now requires only a 6 month or 12 
month holding period before resales —depending on whether the issuer is a reporting 
company or a non-reporting company.  Sjostrom, supra note 31, at 419.  Moreover, for 
offerings to qualified institutional buyers under Rule 144A there is no required holding 
period.  Id.  Estimates are that “over $1 trillion of debt and equity capital was raised in 
2006 through Rule 144A offerings” alone.  Id. at 412.  While the purchaser of securities 
issued pursuant to a non-registered offering cannot bring a § 11 action, he might be able 
to obtain redress through Section 10(b) of the 34 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.  Id. at 
438-39.  Interestingly, Rule 144A played a supporting role in the Refco saga.  In re 
Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig (Refco II), 05 Civ. 8626 (GEL), 2008 WL 3843343, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2008).  Shortly before issuing bonds under the defective registration 
statement, Refco had issued unregistered bonds using Rule 144A.  Id.  Some of the 
holders of the bonds issued through the 144A private placement then exchanged their 
bonds for bonds issued in the 2005 registered offering.  Id.  Those bond holders argued 
that they should be allowed to sue the underwriting firms involved in the Rule 144A 
offering under § 11.  Id.  Two primary arguments were advanced on behalf of the 
holders of the bonds.  Id.  First, the holders argued that § 11 applied because the 
privately placed bonds were issued as part of an “integrated financing scheme” with the 
publicly registered bonds that were issued pursuant to the defective registration 
statement.  Refco II, 2008 WL 3843343, at *1.  However, the court in In re Refco, Inc. 
Securities Litigation (Refco I), found that the two transactions were separate and, 
accordingly, that the holders of the unregistered bonds could not bring a § 11 action 
under an integration theory.  503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  The second 
argument raised by the holders of the Rule 144A bonds was that the underwriters in the 
144A bonds were liable under § 11 because they “played a substantial role in drafting 
and editing” the defective registration statement.  Refco II, 2008 WL 3843343, at *1.  
The court rejected this second argument as well.  Refco I, 503 F. Supp. 2d. at 627-28.  
Tellingly, the court reasoned that participation by an underwriting firm in drafting, 
editing, or other behind the scene activity is not sufficient for purposes of § 11.  Id.  
Rather, the lynchpin for defendant status as underwriters for § 11 is listing the firm as 
an as underwriter such that the firm hold itself “out as evaluating the registered bonds or 
endorsing the registration statement.”  Refco II, 2008 WL 3843343, at *5 
  
While this tracing requirement is usually not difficult to meet for 
securities purchased in initial public offerings (“IPOs”) or for debt 
offerings, it imposes problems for purchasers of securities where the 
 41. Demaria v. Anderson, 318 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2003).  This is referred to as 
tracing.  Id.; see also, Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2005).  In 
addition, the plaintiff would need to bring his § 11 claim within the statute of 
limitations period specified in Section 13, which is 1 year from the date the offense was 
or should have been discovered and 3 years from the offering.  15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
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issuer has various stocks outstanding.42
A registration statement is defective for purposes of Section 11 if it 
contains a material misstatement or omits a material fact necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading.
 
43  Materiality for Section 11 
purposes is analyzed under the standard framework of TSC Industries v. 
Northway.44  Thus, a material misstatement or omission is one where  
there is a substantial likelihood that the fact would have been viewed 
by a reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of 
information.45  Moreover, the probability/magnitude test of Basic v. 
Levinson46 applies as well.47  Both materiality tests are tempered by the 
bespeaks caution doctrine.48
 
 42. See Bloomenthal, Securities Law Handbook § 29.64 (2008).  An investor who 
purchased securities issued pursuant to a defective registration statement in the 
secondary market has standing but that purchaser would have to trace his secondary 
market purchase to the offering statement.  See id. 
 
 43. See § 11.  In terms of who may sue and for which violations, § 11(a) provides 
as follows: 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time 
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in 
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue . . . [list of defendants]. 
Id. 
 44. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 45. Id.; DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 180. 
 46. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 47. Id.  Basic v. Levinson requires an additional level of analysis for the TSC’s 
materiality test, if the event is speculative.  Id. at 232, 238.  Under the 
probability/magnitude test of Basic, one assesses whether a speculative event or 
development needs to be disclosed by weighing the probability that the event will occur 
with the anticipated magnitude of the impact of the event.  Id. at 238. 
 48. Under the “bespeaks caution” doctrine “forecasts, opinions, or projections do 
not amount to ‘material misrepresentations’ if ‘meaningful cautionary statements’ 
accompany the forward-looking statements.”  Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold?:  
Analyst Fraud From Economic and Natural Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 110 
(2007).  In In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., however, the Court noted that a § 11 
claim cannot be dismissed under the “bespeaks cautions” doctrine where the cautionary 
language amounts to only “general risk warnings or mere boilerplate, they must be 
detailed and specific.”  130 F.3d 309, 317 (8th Cir. 1997).  See also In re Giant 
Interactive Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) (explaining 
that in a § 11 case, defendants “cannot, as a matter of law, be absolved of liability 
pursuant to the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine where they failed to disclose the existence 
of facts known for many months that would negatively affect [the issuer’s] business but 
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In addition to Section 11’s plain language specifying precisely who 
has the right to sue and which violations are covered, the statute also 
explicitly lists potential defendants.49  The list includes those who sign 
the registration statement,50 which essentially means the issuer, the 
chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, the comptroller and a 
majority of directors.51 Congress went beyond those who sign the 
registration statement, however. It also expressly listed as potential 
Section 11 defendants the remaining directors,52 various experts who 
prepared or certified a part of the registration statement,53 and, most 
importantly for purposes of this article, the underwriters.54
 
only warned that the facts ‘could’ negatively affect their business”). 
 
 49. Section 11(a) lists the defendants as follows: 
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; 
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or 
partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement 
with respect to which his liability is asserted; 
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as 
being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or 
partner; 
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives 
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as 
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having 
prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the 
registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration statement, 
report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by him; 
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 50. Section 11(a)(1) cross references to § 6 of the Securities Act of 1933 which 
provides in relevant part that a “registration statement . . . .shall be signed by each 
issuer, its principal executive officer or officers, its principal financial officer, its 
comptroller or principal accounting officer, and the majority of its board of directors or 
persons performing similar functions . . . “  15 U.S.C. § 77f. 
 51. Id. 
 52. § 11(a)(2)-(3). 
 53. § 11(a)(4).  The most commonly recognized experts for purposes of § 11(a)(4) 
are the accountants.  Id.  Other experts might include specialized experts such as 
geologists if the registration statement includes an expert report.  Id. 
 54. § 11(a)(5).  If a participant in the registered offering is not listed in §§11(a)(1) 
through (5), there is no § 11 liability, unless the participant is deemed to be a control 
person (under Section 15) of any of the defendants listed.  Id.  Moreover, a participant 
not subject to liability under § 11 (even after applying a control person analysis) could 
in circumstances involving fraud face liability under an anti-fraud provision such as 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.  Id. 
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III. DUE DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF UNDERWRITERS UNDER PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF SECTION 11 AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Clearly, underwriters are listed defendants in Section 11 actions.  
Just as clearly, underwriters have the affirmative defense of due 
diligence that they can use to avoid liability.  A question arises, 
however, as to whether all the underwriters are liable and if they all 
have the affirmative defense.  Again, turning directly to the statute 
helps to answer these questions.   
A. PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 11 REQUIRES ACTION FROM ALL 
UNDERWRITERS: NOT JUST ANOTHER PRETTY FACE 
As a natural starting point, the plain language of Section 11 
provides that a purchaser of a security issued pursuant to a defective 
registration statement may sue “every underwriter with respect to such 
security.”55  The term “every underwriter” clearly means that each 
underwriter in an offering, not just the lead underwriter, is a proper 
Section 11 defendant.56  The term “every” logically encompasses lead, 
managing, and junior underwriters as Section 11 defendants.57  On this 
point, there does not appear to be any serious disagreement.  However, 
there is disagreement as to what the NMUs must do to benefit from the 
affirmative defenses that Congress made available to defendants in 
Section 11(b)(3).58
 
 55. Id. 
  If a defendant underwriter can meet an affirmative 
defense as expressly provided for in Section 11(b)(3), that defendant can 
avoid liability even though the defendant served as an underwriter of 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  Bolstering this reading is § 11(e), which limits an underwriter’s liability to 
the total public offering price of the securities underwritten by such underwriter.  § 
11(e). 
 58. Congress also provided two other affirmative defenses for defendants other 
than the issuer.  § 11(b)(1),(2).  Section 11(b)(1) and (2) provide what can be referred to 
as whistle blower defenses.  Id.  Basically, a defendant can assert a (b)(1) defense if 
prior to the effective date of the registration statement the defendant resigned and 
advised the SEC and the issuer in writing about the issue and that the defendant was not 
responsible.  Id. § 11(b)(1).  A defendant can make an (b)(2) defense if after the 
effective date the defendant became aware of the problem and acted quickly and 
advised the SEC and the public and the problem was without this defendants’ 
knowledge.  Id. § 11(b)(2). 
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securities issued pursuant to a defective registration statement.59
In devising affirmative defenses,
 
60
 
 59. Id. § 11(b)(3). 
 Congress distinguished between 
 60. Defendants other than the issuer have the affirmative defenses specified in § 
11(b), which provides as follows: 
(b) Persons exempt from liability upon proof of issues. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section no person, other 
than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of 
proof— 
(1) that before the effective date of the part of the registration statement with 
respect to which his liability is asserted (A) he had resigned from or had taken 
such steps as are permitted by law to resign from, or ceased or refused to act in, 
every office, capacity, or relationship in which he was described in the registration 
statement as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had advised the Commission and 
the issuer in writing that he had taken such action and that he would not be 
responsible for such part of the registration statement; or 
(2) that if such part of the registration statement became effective without his 
knowledge, upon becoming aware of such fact he forthwith acted and advised the 
Commission, in accordance with paragraph (1) of this subsection, and, in addition, 
gave reasonable public notice that such part of the registration statement had 
become effective without his knowledge; or 
(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be 
made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or extract 
from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made on the 
authority of a public official document or statement, he had, after reasonable 
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of 
the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true 
and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein 
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; and (B) as regards any 
part of the registration statement purporting to be made upon his authority as an 
expert or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself 
as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to 
believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became 
effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to 
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the registration statement did 
not fairly represent his statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract 
from his report or valuation as an expert; and (C) as regards any part of the 
registration statement purporting to be made on the authority of an expert (other 
than himself) or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of 
an expert (other than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not 
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that 
the statements therein were untrue or that there was an omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent 
the statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from the report or 
valuation of the expert; and (D) as regards any part of the registration statement 
purporting to be a statement made by an official person or purporting to be a copy 
340 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
material misstatements or omissions in the non-expert portion of the 
registration statement versus those in the expert portion of the 
registration statement.61
If the defect occurred in the non-expert portion of the registration 
statement (e.g., management’s discussion and analysis section), 
defendants must meet a three-prong requirement to avail themselves of 
the affirmative defense.
 
62  Section 11(b)(3)(A) provides that a non-
expert defendant, such as an underwriter, meets its affirmative defense 
for defects in the non-expert portion only if the defendant proves that: 
(1) “he had, after reasonable investigation,” (2) “reasonable grounds to 
believe” and (3) “did believe” that the registration statement did not 
contain a material misstatement or omission.63  This is a three prong 
conjunctive test and all three prongs are vital.64  Thus, if the defendant 
had objectively reasonable grounds to believe, and subjectively did 
believe there was no defect, but the defendant failed to investigate, it 
would not meet its burden.65  Similarly, the defendant’s investigation and 
a reasonable person’s belief based on that investigation would not 
sufficiently establish the defense, if the defendant actually knew there 
was a material misstatement.66
By contrast, if the defect occurred in the portion of the registration 
statement prepared by the experts (e.g., the financial statements prepared 
by the accountants), then a non-expert defendant, including an 
underwriter, could meet the affirmative defense by satisfying a less 
stringent two-prong test.
 
67
 
of or extract from a public official document, he had no reasonable ground to 
believe and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration statement 
became effective, that the statements therein were untrue, or that there was an 
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make 
the statements therein not misleading, or that such part of the registration statement 
did not fairly represent the statement made by the official person or was not a fair 
copy of or extract from the public official document. 
  The underwriter would meet its affirmative 
Id. § 11(b). 
 61. Compare id. § 11(b)(3)(A)  with id. § 11(b)(3)(B). 
 62. Id. § 11(b)(3)(A). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. § 11(b)(3)(C).  Although this two-prong due diligence test is sometimes 
referred to as the reliance test, this author does not find the alternative terminology 
particularly helpful.  Accordingly, this article will refer to the alternative due diligence 
tests as the three-prong and the two-prong tests. 
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defense for a defect in the expert portion by proving: (1) that “he had no 
reasonable ground to believe” there was a defect and (2) that he 
subjectively “did not believe” there was a defect.68  In these expert 
portion cases, the statute does not require the underwriters to undertake a 
due diligence investigation into whether the expert portion of the 
registration statement contains a material misstatement or omits a 
material fact.69  Yet, merely proving one of the two required prongs is 
insufficient.70  Again, the prongs are conjunctive.71  Thus, even if an 
underwriter subjectively believed there was no problem with an offering, 
it would also have to prove there was no “reasonable ground to believe” 
otherwise.72  If, for example, there were “red flags” indicating a problem 
with the expert portion, the defendant would be hard pressed to show he 
met the “no reasonable ground to believe” prong.73
The plain language of Section 11, particularly the phrase “every 
underwriter” found in Section 11(a)(5), coupled with the phrase “he had, 
after reasonable grounds to believe” found in Section 11(a)(3)(A), 
clearly indicates that Congress required each underwriter, not just the 
lead, to meet its affirmative defense to avoid liability.
  Rather, the “red 
flags” would suggest that there were reasonable grounds to believe there 
were significant problems.  In those “red flag” cases, the underwriter 
could still meet its two-prong burden, but it would have to demonstrate 
that despite the red flags it was still reasonable to believe that there were 
no material defects.  As a practical matter, when “red flags” are present, 
the underwriters will want to investigate the red flags in the expert’s 
portion in order to be satisfied.   
74
 
 68. Id. 
  Section 11(d) 
bolsters this reading by setting forth different effective dates for those 
 69. Id.  Of course, if the same defect occurred in both the expert portion and the 
non-expert portion, then the defendant would have to meet the applicable affirmative 
defense for each portion.  In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 683 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 70. § 11(b)(3)(C). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. In In re WorldCom Judge Cote vividly described red flags as including “facts 
or circumstances that ‘would suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the 
probability that she has been defrauded.’”  In re WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 672-73.  
(quoting LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Grp., Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 
2003)). 
 74. §§ 11(a)(5), (b)(3)(A). 
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underwriters who join in the offering later in the selling period. Section 
11(d) provides the following: 
(d) Effective date of registration statement with regard to 
underwriters. If any person becomes an underwriter with respect to 
the security after the part of the registration statement with respect to 
which his liability is asserted has become effective, then for the 
purposes of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section such part 
of the registration statement shall be considered as having become 
effective with respect to such person as of the time when he became 
an underwriter.75
In Section 11(c), Congress provided guidance to defendants 
attempting to prove they had conducted a “reasonable investigation” and 
had “reasonable grounds” to believe.
 
76
(c) Standard of reasonableness.  In determining, for the purpose of 
paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, what constitutes 
reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the 
standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in 
the management of his own property.
  Section 11(c) provides the 
following guiding principle: 
77
 
IV. TRUST LAW TERMINOLOGY USED IN SECTION 11 
 
Discerning the contours of a defendant’s responsibility under the 
“reasonable investigation” and “reasonable grounds” requirements of 
Section 11(c) demands a careful review of the plain language of Section 
 
 75. § 11(d).  One expert in public finance explains that non-managing underwriters 
have more exposure in registered offerings than they do in municipal offerings because 
of the structure of § 11.  “When the issue of the reasonableness of each participating 
underwriter is brought to light, the fundamental difference between liability for nonlead 
underwriters in public finance and nonlead underwriters in corporate finance becomes 
apparent.”  Robert A. Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance § 7:9.1, *7-165 
to 166 (2006).  A plaintiff in a municipal financing offering would have to prove that 
the non-lead underwriters acted with scienter for a Rule 10b-5 claim whereas, a 
“corporate civil action under section 11 . . . has the benefit to the plaintiff of the 
statutory language making ‘every underwriter’ liable without distinction between the 
lead underwriter and the comanagers or syndicate members.” Id. at *7-166. 
 76. § 11(c). 
 77. Id. 
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11(c) in the context of the statute.78  Additionally, a review of the 
statute’s legislative history further aids this search for guidance on the 
parameters of Section 11(c).79
A. BORROWING FIDUCIARY TERMS: ONE SIZE FITS ALL 
 
In his March 29, 1933 transmittal message to Congress seeking 
Federal legislation regulating securities, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
explained that what was needed was “a return to a clearer 
understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage banks, 
corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people’s money 
are trustees acting for others.”80  Much to the dismay of underwriters 
then and now, this trustee principle appears in Section 11 of the 1933 
Act.81
Section 11(c) contains a well-understood phrase borrowed from 
trust law.
 
82  In this section, Congress wrote that a “reasonable 
investigation” is that of a “prudent man in the management of his own 
property.”83  The prudent man phrase is synonymous with the duty of a 
trustee.84
 
 78. Id. 
 
 79. The following reminder by Judge Landau of the Oregon Court of Appeals of 
the “messy realities” of statutory construction is apt:  “Statutory construction is an 
inherently imprecise process and requires careful weighing of linguistic, logical, and 
historical evidence . . . .”  Jack L. Landau, Some Observations About Statutory 
Construction in Oregon, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 68 (1996). 
 80. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message from the President of the United States (Mar. 
29, 1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at item 15:1 (compiled by J.S. Ellenberger & 
Ellen P. Mahar, 1973).  Presidential transmittal letters, while obviously not written by 
Congress, “may be useful in discerning the original point of a statute.”  2A 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48A:11, at 6 (7th ed. 2003).  For an 
authoritative analysis of the history of the debates and conflicting philosophies that 
gave rise to Federal securities legislation after the 1929 crash see 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL 
SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION, 252–305 (4th ed. 2006).  For an 
intriguing description of development of the Securities and Exchange Commission see 
generally  JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed. 
2003). 
 81. Securities Act, § 11. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 267 (3rd ed. 
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By using this well-understood phrase, Congress clearly insisted on 
the same quality of investigation that would be required of a trustee—no 
more and certainly no less.  Although this reading is clear, SIFMA, in 
the amicus it filed in the Refco litigation, suggests that the “prudent man 
in the management of his own property” phrase requires less care than 
would be required of a fiduciary.85  SIFMA argues, “by expressly 
incorporating a ‘prudence’ standard, Section 11(c) necessarily requires 
courts and juries to measure the conduct of underwriters by the 
reasonable commercial standards of their day.”86
The conference report for the 1933 Act explains that the fiduciary 
standard adopted in Section 11(c) was actually a compromise position.
  However, such a 
reading of the statute and the legislative history of Section 11(c) is 
mistaken. 
87  
The Senate wanted a stricter “insurer” standard for defendants, while the 
House wanted the fiduciary standard.88  The compromise made at 
conference was to accept the “fiduciary” standard from the House 
version, but to include the additional defendants listed in the Senate 
version, such as underwriters and experts.89
 
2004).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (“The trustee is 
under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill 
as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if 
the trustee has . . . greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a 
duty to exercise such skill.”).  The same language appeared in the RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1935). 
  Also instructive is that civil 
 85. See SIFMA Refco Amicus, supra note 6, at 2. 
 86. Id. 
 87. H.R. REP. NO. 73-152 (1993) (Conf. Rep.) (to accompany H.R. 5480) 
[hereinafter Conference Report]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  The Conference Report explains this compromise as follows: 
A point of difference between the House bill and the Senate amendment concerned 
the civil liability of persons responsible for the flotation of an issue.  The Senate 
amendment imposed upon the issuer, its directors, its chief executive, and financial 
officers a liability, which might appropriately be denominated as an insurer’s 
liability. They were held liable without regard to whatever care they may have 
used for the accuracy of the statement made in the registration statement.  The 
House bill, on the other hand, measured liability for these statements in terms of 
reasonable care, placing upon the defendants the duty, in case they were sued, of 
proving that they had used reasonable care to assure the accuracy of these 
statements. The standard by which reasonable care was exemplified was expressed 
in terms of a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary under the law is bound to exercise 
diligence of a type commensurate with the confidence, both as to integrity and 
competence, that is placed in him. . . . . In choosing between these two standards of 
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liability under Section 12 of the 1933 Act, which also appeared in H.R. 
5480, never used any fiduciary terminology,90 thus making it clear that 
Congress intended a higher hurdle under Section 11.91
Perhaps confusion as to the required reasonable investigation 
necessary for the Section 11 due diligence defense arises because the 
original wording of Section 11(c) was revised the following year.  The 
original version of Section 11(c), enacted in May of 1933 as part of the 
1933 Act, provided: 
 
(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) 
of this section, what constitutes reasonable investigation and 
reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be 
that required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship.92
However, when Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“the 1934 Act”), it also amended portions of the then-recently 
enacted 1933 Act, including Section 11(c).  Thus, in 1934, Congress 
restated Section 11(c) of the 1933 Act to provide that the standard of 
reasonableness is “that required of a prudent man in the management of 
his own property.” 
 
93
The legislative history makes clear, however, that Congress did not 
intend any substantive change when it revised the language of Section 
11(c).
 
94
 
liabilities, the Senate accepted the standards imposed by the House bill.  Though 
the standards of the Senate amendment were more severe than those embodied in 
the House bill, the classes of persons upon whom liability was imposed were less. 
The House bill imposed liability upon the underwriters and also upon the experts, 
such as accountants, appraisers and engineers, who gave the authority of their 
names to statements made in the registration statement. 
  The conference committee report for the 1934 Act explains that 
Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong. § 11(c) (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at item 24:24 
(compiled by J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973) (emphasis added). 
 93. Securities Act § 11(c) (emphasis added). 
 94. Ernest L. Folk, III, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts:  The 
BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1969).  Professor Folk notes that the revised 
“language chosen in 1934 precisely duplicates the wording of the standard of care in the 
contemporary Restatement of Trusts.” Id. at 44. Professor Folk also observes that the 
fiduciary language adopted refers to a prudent man managing his own “property” – a 
measure that denotes the higher trustee standard not a prudent man managing his own 
“affairs,” which would instead suggest the slightly lesser corporate director fiduciary 
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the language change in Section 11(c) was simply to clarify that Congress 
wanted the standard common law fiduciary language to apply.95  
According to the report, “[t]he amendment to section 11(c) removes 
possible uncertainties as to the standard of reasonableness by 
substituting for the present language the accepted common law 
definition of the duty of a fiduciary.”96  Significantly, in response to 
heavy lobbying by financial interests, Congress liberalized other parts of 
Section 11 through amendments enacted as part of the 1934 legislation, 
but it did not deviate from the fiduciary standard for defendants in 
Section 11(c).97
While Congress clearly intended the trustee standard, the trust 
analysis is not a perfect fit.  A typical trustee relationship requires not 
just a fiduciary, but also a settlor and beneficiaries.
 
98  Here, Congress’ 
fiduciary language requires some creative license.  While the issuer 
could be deemed the settlor, the issuer is also a defendant under Section 
11 by virtue of Section 6.  Thus, any “trust” agreement between the 
issuer and the underwriters waiving any fiduciary duties on the part of 
the underwriters would seem self-serving at best.  Trust law, however, 
allows settlors to serve as trustees.99  Moreover, even when a settlor 
serves as a trustee, trust law allows the settlor, through a trust document, 
to waive certain of the trustee’s duties.100  On the other hand, certain 
trustee’s duties are mandatory and cannot be waived by agreement 
between the settlor and the trustee.101
 
standard. Id. 
  Perhaps the “settlor” in a 
registered offering is in part the issuer but also in part the investors. 
 95. See Conference Report, supra note 87. 
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838.  See also , 78 CONG. REC. 8716 (statement of Comm’r 
James M. Landis): 
The present section 11(c) fixes as the standard of reasonableness the standard 
required of a person occupying ‘a fiduciary relationship.’  This definition has 
apparently created considerable consternation, and I would be agreeable to a 
change which would state the meaning of a fiduciary relationship in commonly 
accepted terminology.  I do not, however, believe that a definition of the standard 
of reasonableness as a fiduciary standard should be omitted from this section of the 
act. 
Id. (asking Senator Fletchor to print the proposed amendments to § 11(c) of the 1933 
Act in the Congressional Record). 
 97. See Conference Report, supra note 87. 
 98. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §§ 3, 66 (1935).   
 99. Id. § 17. 
 100. Id. § 100. 
 101. Id. 
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Similarly, the intended beneficiaries of such a trust relationship are 
less than clear.  From the legislative history, it appears that the intended 
“beneficiaries” of this imperfect trust relationship are the investors who 
purchase the securities pursuant to a defective registration statement.  In 
that context, the trustee relationship is a hybrid private and public trust.  
It seems that Congress intended, at least in part, a quasi-public trust 
where the public (albeit, limited to the actual investors) are the intended 
beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty.102  Although the conceptual fit of trust 
law is somewhat imperfect, it is clear that Section 11(c) holds 
underwriters to such a trust law fiduciary standard when attempting to 
meet their due diligence affirmative defense.103  There are other 
fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationships, but it is the trust law fiduciary 
that Congress chose.104
B. DELEGATING RESPONSIBILITIES: JUST WATCH ME 
 
Requiring a fiduciary standard for reasonable investigation does 
not mean, however, that an underwriter must personally perform the 
investigation.  Rather, trustees today, and back when Congress passed 
Section 11(c), can assign or delegate certain responsibilities to others. 
Undoubtedly, Congress recognized the ability of fiduciaries to 
delegate certain functions.  An earlier draft of Section 11(c) confirms 
that Congress accepted some delegation, because it expressly eschewed 
unjustified delegation of responsibilities.  Section 11(c), as contained in 
 
 102. Conference Report, supra note 87. 
 103. Securities Act § 11. 
 104. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 84, at 4260 (quoting the RESTATEMENT OF 
TRUSTS (SECOND) § 174 (1959)). Other fiduciary relationships abound but differ 
substantively from the trustee relationship. For example, an agent is in part a fiduciary, 
but unlike a trustee, an agent serves only his principal whereas a trustee serves the 
beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5.   The different fiduciary 
responsibilities of agents and trustees is not new.  It was quite clear when Congress 
elected to use the trustee standard in § 11(c).  See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
AGENCY (1933); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS (1935).  Thus, arguments, such as 
the one proffered by the underwriters in Refco (Underwriters’ Memorandum in 
Opposition, supra note 2, at 19) suggesting that agency law rather than trust law 
determine the due diligence and supervision responsibilities of NMUs are not 
persuasive. Of course, Congress only borrowed an aspect of trust law and did not intend 
to create a trust.  Conference Report, supra note 87.  Beyond a trustee with duties and 
identifiable beneficiaries, a true trust requires the substantive elements of trust intent, 
trust property, and purpose.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 66. 
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H.R. 5480, provided: 
(c) In determining for purposes of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of 
this section what constitutes a reasonable investigation and 
reasonable grounds for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be 
that required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship.  While 
subsections (b) and (c) permit a person who has conscientiously and 
with competence met the responsibilities of his trusteeship to be 
relieved of liability, they prevent any person who has not fulfilled his 
trust from escaping liability by any trick of procedure or unjustified 
delegation of his duties (emphasis added).105
Moreover, the conference committee report for the version of 
Section 11(c) that passed as part of the 1933 Act
 
106 explains that the 
fiduciary standard imposed on a Section 11 defendant “does not, of 
course, necessitate that he shall individually perform every duty imposed 
upon him.”107
Delegation to others of the performance of acts which is 
unreasonable to require that the fiduciary shall personally perform is 
permissible.  Especially is this true where the character of the acts 
involves professional skill or facilities not possessed by the fiduciary 
himself.  In such cases reliance by the fiduciary, if his reliance is 
reasonable in the light of all the circumstances, is a full discharge of 
his responsibilities.
  That conference report clarifies allowable delegation as 
follows: 
108
This delegation language is borrowed from standard trust common 
law.
 
109
Two interrelated fiduciary delegation issues require consideration.  
The first issue is which activities a fiduciary can delegate to its agents, 
as opposed to which activities a fiduciary must perform personally.  In 
the context of underwriters and due diligence, this requires an 
understanding of when underwriters can delegate certain investigative 
responsibilities to their own lawyers, advisors, or other agents.  The 
  Thus, an examination of the parameters of acceptable delegation 
by trustees may provide insight on the parameters of acceptable 
delegation by underwriters. 
 
 105. Conference Report, supra note 87, at 23. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 26. 
 109. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 84, at 4260. 
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second fiduciary delegation issue requires an analysis of when a co-
fiduciary can delegate responsibilities to other co-fiduciaries.  In the 
underwriters’ framework, this entails an analysis of when NMUs can 
delegate investigative responsibilities, not to their own agents, but rather 
to the lead underwriter.110
What was the prevailing law in the 1930s regarding a trustee’s 
ability to delegate under the common law of trusts when Congress 
borrowed the concept for purposes of a “reasonable investigation” under 
Section 11?  Could one co-trustee delegate all responsibilities to 
another?  Guidance on delegation by co-trustees is found in an  
influential 1921 Harvard Law Review article written by Professor 
George Gleason Bogert, an eminent authority on trusts.
  An analysis of fiduciary delegation in the 
context of underwriters requires an amalgamation of both the agent issue 
and the co-fiduciary issue.  Moreover, since the agents of the lead 
underwriter (including its legal counsel) perform many tasks of the due 
diligence investigation, the inquiry must also include an analysis of 
when a co-fiduciary’s agent can properly serve as another co-fiduciary’s 
agent. 
111  Professor 
Bogert explains that the co-trustee situation arises because a settlor may 
desire multiple trustees in order to benefit from the combined “skill and 
judgment of several” in managing a large estate.112  “One trustee may be 
selected on account of his reputation for honesty and acumen, another 
because of business association with the settlor, and still a third from 
motives of relationship.”113  Professor Bogert notes, however, that such 
co-trustees will also commonly have “inequality of experience, ability, 
prudence and initiative,”114 which, in turn, often leads to an “inequality 
of participation” in managing the trust.115
The extreme version of “inequality of participation” occurs when 
one co-trustee is completely in charge and the others are inactive.
 
116
 
 110. As a practical matter these issues are often intertwined. 
  If 
 111. George Gleason Bogert, The Liability of an Inactive Co-Trustee, 34 HARV. L. 
REV. 483, 483 (1921). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  There are similar varied reasons for inviting certain distinct underwriters to 
join the syndicate for a registered offering. 
 114. Id.  A corollary in the underwriting syndicate context is that some underwriters 
might have significantly less experience in underwriting sizable offerings than other 
underwriters or the various underwriting firms have different expertise. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Bogert, supra note 111, at 483. 
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the trust funds are administered properly under the sole administration of 
the managing trustee and the value of the trust is not adversely affected, 
there is no concern.  Issues arise, however, when, for example, due to 
the “inaptitude of the managing trustee the trust fund has been reduced 
or altogether dissipated.”117  In that case, the question is whether an 
inactive trustee can be held liable “when the trust estate has been 
diminished by the negligence or defalcation of an active co-trustee.”118
Professor Bogert admonishes that any analysis of the liability of 
inactive co-trustees in these cases must take into account certain 
fundamental principles of trust law.
 
119  He specifically notes the 
following well-established trust principles: (1) a “trustee may not 
delegate the exercise of discretionary powers, but may leave to agents 
the performance of ministerial duties or mere mechanical acts” and (2) a 
“trustee is required to use the care which an ordinarily prudent man 
would use in the conduct of his own affairs.” 120
The first rule, restricting delegation of a trustee’s discretionary 
powers is based, in part, on the assumption that each co-trustee has 
particular qualifications and abilities and is expected to use those 
abilities—whatever they are—on behalf of the trust.
 
121  The delegation 
restriction is also explained as serving “to prevent the trust estate from 
paying twice for the same service.”122  Moreover, an extreme 
delegation—say of all responsibilities—is viewed as inconsistent with 
acceptance of the trusteeship.  Professor Bogert explains, “a trustee who 
accepts a trust impliedly promises to assume his full share of control and 
responsibility.”123  He further reasons that “[n]onfeasance where there is 
a duty to act ought to be regarded as the equivalent of misfeasance.”124  
Thus, once a trustee accepts the role, he must be active.125
 
 117. Id. 
  An inactive 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The Transmogrification of the American Trust, 31 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 253 (1996). 
 122. Id. at 254. 
 123. Bogert, supra note 111, at 503. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1935).  That section provides 
that the “trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of 
acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform.”  Id.  Comment 
k thereof provides with regard to supervision of delegated functions the following:  “In 
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co-trustee could be liable for total delegation of his responsibilities.  
Professor Bogert reasons that beneficiaries “have a right to expect that 
trustees who accept the trust will give the estate the benefit of their skill 
and honesty and not merely of their names.”126  He counsels that trustees 
who expect not to participate actively should decline to serve as trustee 
rather than mislead others by attaching their names to the trust.127
Whether an inactive co-trustee who allows a co-trustee to be the 
sole actor also violates Professor Bogert’s second fundamental principle 
of trust law, requiring the care of “an ordinary prudent man in the 
conduct of his own affairs,” requires more analysis.
 
128  If the managing 
co-trustee has a superb reputation, is the co-trustee justified in his 
inaction?  Would a prudent man conducting his own affairs cede to 
another all authority without vigilance?  Professor Bogert explains, “an 
inactive trustee is not bound to presume that his co-trustee is a rogue, but 
he is presumed to know the frailties of human nature,” and thus must 
supervise the co-trustee.129  He explains that a prudent man managing 
his own affairs would inspect and supervise the actions of even a 
reputable actor.130  Professor Bogert adds, however, that if the otherwise 
passive co-trustee effectively supervises the acts of his managing co-
trustee, “he may be said to make the acts of the managing co-trustee his 
own acts.”131  On the other hand, if he fails to supervise, he breaches the 
prudent man requirement.132
Professor Bogert’s analysis of the inactive co-trustee proved 
influential in an important 1927 New York case, Brown v. Phelan.
 
133  In 
that case, the trust was to be managed by three co-trustees, two sons of 
the settlor and his good friend.134
 
matters which a trustee has properly delegated to agents or co-trustees or other persons, 
he is under a duty to the beneficiary to exercise a general supervision over their 
conduct.” Id. cmt. k. 
  One of the sons lived outside of New 
York City and the friend was quite elderly, so only the remaining co-
 126. Bogert, supra note 111, at 507. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 501. 
 129. Id. at 502. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 224 N.Y.S. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1927). 
 134. Id. at 393. 
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trustee managed the trust.135  Unfortunately, the managing co-trustee 
looted the trust and disappeared.136  The beneficiaries of the trust—
primarily the settlor’s other children—sought to charge the inactive co-
trustees for breach of their prudent man duty to the trust.137  The court 
accepted that the two inactive co-trustees had no knowledge of the 
failures of the manager and that there were legitimate reasons for 
allowing the managing trustee to take the lead.138  The court explained, 
however, that “acceptance of a trust imposes certain positive 
responsibility which the trustee cannot evade,” and “if he is not inclined 
to meet them, he should not accept.”139  Citing Professor Bogert’s 1921 
law review article on inactive co-trustees, the court determined that the 
two inactive co-trustees were liable.140  The court reasoned that “judged 
by the measure of care of the ordinary prudent man, the inactive trustee 
is guilty of a fault of failing to supervise.”141  With regard to the 
disappearance of certain securities, the co-trustees argued that the court 
should not hold them liable to the trust beneficiaries for failure to inspect 
and supervise the managing co-trustee because the beneficiaries also had 
the right to inspect and similarly failed to do so.142  The court found, 
however, that the co-trustees responsibilities could not be discharged by 
the “mere failure of the beneficiaries to exercise a like duty.”143
Of course, that was then—this is now.  In the 1930s, Congress 
borrowed a well understood common law trustee standard and inserted it 
into the securities statute.
 
144
 
 135. Id. 
  Since then, however, the trust laws 
governing trustee delegation have changed. When Congress imports a 
well understood common law term into a statute, does the term bring 
with it its then existing meaning and case law, or does the meaning of 
the common law term in the statute evolve as the common law for 
that term develops?   Thus, should the prudent man standard imported 
into Section 11(c) be analyzed in accordance with its common law 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 394. 
 139. Id. at 396. 
 140. Id. at 397. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 398. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)). 
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meaning when the term was inserted into Section 11 (“original intent”) 
or should it instead be analyzed as the term is currently understood for 
trust law purposes (“dynamic intent”)?   
Section 11(c) was designed to deter and curtail certain Wall Street 
behaviors that led to an economic collapse of the financial markets.  
Thus, it seems unlikely that Congress would have desired the term 
“prudent man” in the securities context to incorporate modifications to 
its meaning as the common law of trusts evolved, if such modifications 
would reopen the door to abuses of the sort Congress sought to prevent.  
This article does not, however, need to determine whether the original or 
dynamic intent model of interpretation is better suited for Section 11(c) 
analysis.145
Clearly, modern trust law allows trustees considerably more latitude 
in delegating than earlier trust law.  Presuming that trust settlors chose 
particular trustees for a reason, earlier trust laws charged trustees with 
personally performing virtually all trust tasks.  Those laws prohibited 
trustees from delegating “discretionary” functions and allowed for the 
delegation of only ministerial duties.
  Even under the more lenient rules of fiduciary delegation 
applicable today, trustees continue to have the fiduciary responsibility to 
supervise and review the activities of their delegates. 
146
 
 145. William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts:  The Relationship Between 
CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 193, 216 n. 124 (1996).  One 
commentator has explained that even Justice Scalia appears to vacillate between both 
approaches.  Id.  Professor Araiza observed that in some cases Justice Scalia has 
interpreted an older term by reference to its meaning when first inserted into a statute. 
Id.; see e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).  In 
MCI Justice Scalia referred to a 1934 dictionary for the analysis of a particular term in 
the statute.  Id.  In other cases, however, Justice Scalia has used a dynamic model.  
Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).  In Business Electronics 
Justice Scalia allowed that sometimes a borrowed common law term is dynamic.  Id. 
  As trust investing and 
The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’  along with its dynamic 
potential.  It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that 
the common law had assigned to the term in 1890 . . . [i]f it were otherwise, not 
only would the line of per se illegality have to be drawn today precisely where it 
was in 1890, but also case-by-case evaluation of legality (conducted where per se 
rules do not apply) would have to be governed by 19th-century notions of 
reasonableness.  It would make no sense to create out of the single term ‘restraint 
of trade’ a chronologically schizoid statute, in which a ‘rule of reason’ evolves 
with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains 
forever fixed where it was. 
Id. 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 cmt. g (2007). 
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administration became more complicated, however, it became evident 
that the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy was not only vague, but that 
it also deprived trusts of desirable expertise from third parties.  
Accordingly, over time, what was once viewed as the no delegation duty 
evolved into a prudent delegation rule. 
The modern common law of trusts allows trustees to delegate even 
certain discretionary functions.147  Moreover, it is clear now that if a 
trustee prudently selects the agent and properly monitors and supervises 
that agent, the trustee is not liable even if the agent ultimately fails to 
perform in the interests of the beneficiaries.148  Nevertheless, the 
supervision and monitoring function remains critical.  The Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts, Section 80, admonishes that after prudent selection of 
the agent, the trustee “has a further duty to act with prudence in 
supervising or monitoring the agent’s performance and compliance with 
the terms of the delegation.”149  Similarly, newer statutory-based trust 
laws, such as those based on the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”), allow 
trustees to delegate “duties and powers that a prudent trustee of 
comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances,”150 
yet require the prudent trustee to supervise and monitor the agent’s 
actions.151
 
 147. Id. § 80. 
 
 148. Id. cmt. g. 
 149. Id. cmt. d(2).  Anton v. Anton is instructive as to a modern court’s analysis of an 
inactive co-trustee’s fiduciary duties.  815 So. 2d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th DCA 
2002).  In that case, a dishonest co-trustee had converted funds from the trust for his 
own personal use.  Id. at 769.  The beneficiary of the trust sued the other co-trustee 
named in the trust for breach of his fiduciary duty.  Id.  The co-trustee argued that he 
should be relieved from his fiduciary responsibility to the trust because the dishonest 
co-trustee was an attorney and, accordingly, he was justified in delegating the complete 
administration of the trust to him.  Id.  The court rejected that argument.  Id.  The court 
recognized that certain trusts are managed by co-trustees, but reasoned that where 
“there are several trustees, each is under a duty to participate fully in the administration 
of the trust.”  Id. at 769.  In addition, the court stressed that “co-trustees are required to 
maintain an attitude of vigilant concern.”  Id. at 770.  The court then noted that the 
inactive co-trustee had “paid no attention whatsoever to the manner in which the co-
trustee administered the trust.”  Id.  In light of the complete failure to review or 
supervise the delegate, the court found the co-trustee liable for the loss caused by the 
dishonest co-trustee.  Id. 
 150. U.T.C. § 807 (2004). 
 151. U.T.C. § 807(a)(3).  In addition, § 806 provides that if a trustee has special 
skills or expertise, or is named in reliance upon the trustee’s representation that the 
trustee has special skills or expertise, that trustee is expected to use those skills.  U.T.C. 
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In her perceptive article about professional trustees’ responsibilities, 
Professor Melanie Leslie analyzes a modern professional trustee’s 
continued responsibilities to beneficiaries after a proper delegation to 
agents.152
1) a rule that relieves the trustee from all liability if the agent harms 
the trust, 2) a rule that holds the trustee liable only if its failure to 
carefully select and supervise the agent contributes to the trust’s 
losses, or 3) a rule that makes the trustee liable for losses caused by 
its agent.
  She reasons that after a proper delegation there are three 
options for implementing the trustee’s continued responsibilities: 
153
The first option allows for total inactivity by the delegating 
fiduciary.
 
154  The second option—the current modern trust law 
requirement—allows prudent delegation but requires monitoring by the 
trustee of the delegate.155  The last option imposes strict liability on 
professional trustees for their delegates’ failures.156
Professor Leslie quickly dismisses the non-supervision option,
 
157  
stating that the “first option is unwise for obvious reasons.”158  She then 
carefully analyzes the current system that allows a trustee who properly 
monitors his delegate to avoid liability even though the beneficiaries are 
harmed.159  Professor Leslie compares the current system to a system 
that would impose strict liability on the professional trustee.160  She 
ultimately advocates for imposing strict liability on the delegating 
professional trustee when beneficiaries are harmed.161
How does trust law analysis tie into an NMU’s duties after 
delegating a due diligence investigation to the lead?  Should Professor 
 
 
§ 806.  Moreover, with regard to co-trustees, § 703 provides that functions which a 
settlor reasonably expected the trustees to perform jointly are non-delegable.  U.T.C. § 
703(e). 
 152. Malanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense:  Fiduciary Standards and 
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2736 (2006). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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Leslie’s strict liability system for professional trustees also apply to 
underwriters?  Professor Coffee, among others, has promoted such a 
strict liability system for offerings.162
Clearly, under the law of trusts in the 1930s and presently, trustees 
who delegate must monitor their delegates.  Similarly, participating 
NMUs who delegate investigative responsibilities must supervise or 
review their delegate’s actions to meet their statutory affirmative defense 
under the “prudent man” standard of Section 11.  A careful reading of 
the statutory scheme suggests that an inactive underwriter, like an 
“inactive trustee,” would fail to meet the prudent man requirement if it 
failed to supervise its delegate.
  There is some appeal in such a 
straightforward system.  However, a strict liability system requires 
Congress to change the statute and suggests that underwriters are, in 
effect, insuring against misstatements.  This article, instead, more 
modestly suggests that the industry and the courts return to fundamental 
principles and recognize all underwriters’ responsibilities under the 
wording of the statute. 
163
 
V. CASE LAW AND SEC GUIDELINES ON NON-MANAGING 
UNDERWRITERS’ DUE DILIGENCE 
 
The case law and SEC guidance support this monitoring analysis 
for non-managing underwriters.  
A. DUE DILIGENCE CASES AND SEC GUIDELINES DESCRIBE 
UNDERWRITERS’ ROLE: WORTH A CLOSER LOOK 
The leading case construing the due diligence affirmative defense 
under section 11 remains the decades-old BarChris.164
 
 162. Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 16. 
  The BarChris 
 163. Securities Act § 11 (1933). 
 164. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  BarChris 
Construction Corporation was engaged in the business of constructing bowling alleys.  
Id. at 653.  Under BarChris’ business model, BarChris made substantial expenditures 
before receiving reimbursement from customers.  Id. at 654.  Consequently, BarChris 
was in constant need of cash to finance its operations.  Id.  In early 1961, BarChris 
decided to issue debentures, and in March, 1961, BarChris filed an initial registration 
statement with the SEC.  Id.  The registration statement became effective on May 16, 
1961.  BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 654.  By that time, BarChris was experiencing 
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court carefully examined the prudent man requirement of the statute and 
noted that, under the statutory scheme, a defendant could “escape 
liability only by using that reasonable care to investigate facts which a 
prudent man would employ in the management of his own property.”165  
In terms of reliance on others to perform the investigation, the court 
admonished that “a prudent man would not act in an important matter 
without any knowledge of the relevant facts, in sole reliance upon 
representations of persons who are comparative strangers and upon 
general information which does not purport to cover the particular 
case.”166
With regard to underwriters, while the court recognized that the 
level of required investigation “is a question of degree, a matter of 
judgment in each case,”
 
167 the court also explained that, under the 
applicable statutory scheme, underwriters “are made responsible for the 
truth of the prospectus.”168  It acknowledged that if underwriters “may 
escape that responsibility by taking at face value representations made to 
them . . . then the inclusion of underwriters among those liable under 
Section 11 affords the investors no additional protection.”169  
Accordingly, the court reasoned that to “effectuate the statute’s purpose, 
the phrase ‘reasonable investigation’ must be construed to require more 
effort on the part of the underwriters than the mere accurate reporting in 
the prospectus of ‘data presented’ to them.”170
Applying this standard to the investigation performed by the lead 
underwriter, Drexel & Co. (“Drexel”), the court found that Drexel did 
not fulfill the reasonable investigation requirement and thus failed to 
establish due diligence.
 
171  The court then found that the NMUs also 
failed to meet their burden.172
 
substantial cash flow difficulties.  Id. at 653.  On October 29, 1962 BarChris filed for 
bankruptcy.  Id.  On November 1, it defaulted on the payment of interest on the 
debentures.  Id.  The purchasers of the debentures offered pursuant to BarChris’ public 
offering sued the underwriters, among others, under § 11.  Id. at 652. 
  It explained that the “other underwriters, 
who did nothing and relied solely on Drexel and on the lawyers, are 
 165. Id. at 688. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 697. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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bound” by Drexel and the lawyers’ failure to make an adequate 
examination.173  The court did not find that any of the underwriters knew 
that the prospectus was defective.174  Rather, it explained that the 
underwriters’ defense failed because “although Drexel and the other 
underwriters believed that [the non-expert] portions of the prospectus 
were true, they had no reasonable ground for that belief, within the 
meaning of the statute.”175  Notably, the court recognized that its holding 
did not address “whether the underwriters other than Drexel would have 
been protected if Drexel had established that, as lead underwriter, it 
made a reasonable investigation.”176  In other words, BarChris left 
unresolved the issue of whether NMUs meet their burden if the lead 
establishes that it had made a reasonable investigation.177
A couple of years after the BarChris case, the SEC issued Release 
No. 9671.
 
178  Significantly, the SEC stated that the “release places the 
investment banking community on notice as to the need to diligently 
investigate the disclosure provided to the public in connection with the 
securities they are distributing . . . .”179  Essentially, Release No. 9671 
elaborated on the basic framework for due diligence obligations imposed 
on the investment banking community “who participate as members of 
the underwriting group.”180  The SEC explained that the underwriters’ 
role in a public offering is unique for purposes of due diligence,181 
reasoning that the underwriter is in a particularly powerful position.182  
On the one hand, the underwriter can walk away from an offering if it 
does not obtain satisfactory access to information or if it does not 
receive appropriate responses to the questions it poses to the issuer.183
 
 173. Id. 
  
On the other hand, the issuer is unlikely to risk the underwriter walking 
because the issuer needs the underwriters’ participation for the offering 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at n.26. 
 178. Obligations of Underwriters, Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 
9671, 1972 WL 125474 (July 27, 1972) [hereinafter SEC Release 9671]. 
 179. Id. at 1. 
 180. Id. at 6. 
 181. Id. at 5. 
 182. Id. at 4-5. 
 183. Id. 
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to succeed.184  Thus, the underwriter has the power to “demand access to 
information.”185
With regard to NMUs, the Release explains that “Section 11 does 
not by its terms distinguish between managing underwriters (managers) 
and underwriters who participate as members of the underwriting group 
(participants),” but rather that Section 11 “speaks only of ‘every 
underwriter’ of whatever type.”
 
186  Accordingly, it reinforces that every 
underwriter has responsibilities under the statute.187  Nevertheless, the 
Release recognizes that NMUs “need not duplicate the investigation 
made by the [lead]” and “may delegate the performance of the 
investigation” to the lead.188
In keeping with the statutory scheme’s focus on every underwriter, 
however, the Release admonishes that delegation to the lead does not 
absolve the NMUs of their own independent responsibilities.
 
189  It 
expressly provides that while “the participant may relieve himself of the 
task of actually verifying the representation in the registration statements 
. . . he must satisfy himself that the managing underwriter makes the 
kind of investigation that the participant would have performed if he 
were the manager.”190  Accordingly, NMUs must assure themselves not 
only that the lead’s “program of investigation” is adequate, but also that 
the lead’s “actual investigative performance” is adequate.191  Thus, 
supervision of the actual investigation requires more than a review of 
generic procedures typically followed by the lead underwriters.192
Moreover, the SEC did not intend the supervision of the lead 
underwriter’s investigation to be a formality or an exercise in futility.
  The 
Release expects the NMU to check the managing underwriters’ actual 
investigation of the issuer and of the particular offering. 
193  
Rather, the SEC expects that the NMU’s supervision of its delegate will 
add value.194
 
 184. Id. 
  The Release provides that the “participants’ checks on the 
 185. Id. at 5. 
 186. Id. at 6. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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manager are vital since they may provide additional assurance of 
verification of the statements in the registration statement.”195  Thus, 
consistent with the statutory framework and the prudent man 
requirement, SEC Release No. 9671 requires NMUs who delegate the 
investigation to the lead to conduct some monitoring and supervision of 
the lead’s investigation in order to meet their due diligence burden.196
The SEC further clarified its view of what constitutes a reasonable 
investigation in light of changes to the offering process implemented 
through Rule 176,
 
197 and it identified “what circumstances may bear 
upon the determination of what constitutes a reasonable investigation 
and reasonable ground for belief as these terms are used in Section 11(b) 
of the Securities Act.”198
 
 195. Id. at 4. 
  Particularly relevant, the SEC recognizes a 
sliding scale application of the level of due diligence an underwriter 
must conduct in meeting the reasonable investigation standard.  This 
interpretation acknowledges industry concerns of underwriters regarding 
 196. Id. 
 197. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, SEC Release No. 33-6383; 47 FR 
11433 (Mar. 16, 1982) [hereinafter SEC Release 33-6383].  Rule 176 provides the 
following guidance: 
In determining whether or not the conduct of a person constitutes a reasonable 
investigation or a reasonable ground for belief meeting the standard set forth in 
section 11(c), relevant circumstances include, with respect to a person other than 
the issuer: 
The type of issuer; 
The type of security; 
The type of person; 
The office held when the person is an officer; 
The presence or absence of another relationship to the issuer when the person is a 
director or proposed director; 
Reasonable reliance on officers, employees, and others whose duties should have 
given them knowledge of the particular facts; 
When the person is an underwriter, the type of underwriting arrangement, the role 
of the particular person as an underwriter and the availability of information with 
respect to the registrant; and 
Whether, with respect to a fact or document incorporated by reference, the 
particular person had any responsibility for the fact or document at the time of the 
filing from which it was incorporated. 
Id. 
 198. Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable 
Investigation and Reasonable Grounds for Belief Under Section 11 of Securities Act 
Treatment of Information Incorporated by Reference Into Registration Statements, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-6335, 23 SEC Docket 1 (Aug. 6, 1981) [hereinafter SEC 
Release 33-6335]. 
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their ability to “conduct what would be deemed to be a reasonable 
investigation, pursuant to Section 11.”199  The SEC makes clear that 
NMUs may “not have as heavy a burden as that of the managing 
underwriters” in fulfilling their Section 11 due diligence duties; 
nonetheless, a pro-active role of vigilance by participating underwriters 
is required.200  Significantly, the SEC “strongly affirms the need for due 
diligence and its attendant vigilance and verification” on behalf of 
underwriters.201
In December of 2005, the SEC adopted significant registration and 
offering reforms to the offering processes under the Securities Act of 
1933.
 
202  Among other things, these reforms further eased the 
restrictions on shelf offerings for well-known issuers, commonly known 
as WKSIs.203  In the adopting release, the SEC addressed a number of 
issues, including “whether adjustments to the roles and responsibilities 
of traditional ‘gatekeepers’ in the . . . securities offering process, such as 
underwriters . . . should be made in light of increases in the speed of and 
other evolutions in the offering process.”204  It recognized that some 
commentators wanted the SEC to modify Rule 176 and to narrow the 
due diligence requirements for underwriters in light of the unlimited 
shelf registrations for WKSIs.205  The SEC, however, declined “to 
propose modifications to Rule 176,” and, thus, maintained its position 
on due diligence standards for underwriters.206
 
 199. Id. at 5.  “In view of the compressed preparation time and the volatile nature of 
the capital markets, underwriters may elect to apply somewhat different, but equally 
thorough, investigatory practices and procedures.  Id. at 11; § 11(c).  Reasonable 
investigation is measured by “that required of a prudent man in the management of his 
own property.”  Id. at 9. 
 
 200. SEC Release 9671, supra note 178, at 6. 
 201. SEC Release 33-6335, supra note 198, at 11. 
 202. Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8591, 85 SEC Docket 2871 
(Dec. 1, 2005) [hereinafter SEC Release 33-8591]. 
 203. Id. at 6. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 97.  The SEC explained that: 
An automatic shelf registration statement will become effective immediately and 
will cover an unspecified amount of securities.  [Resulting from] the open-ended 
nature of such registration statements, [the SEC] adopt[ed] a requirement for 
issuers to file new automatic shelf registration statements every three years.  As a 
result, an issuer’s securities offerings under the registration statement can be 
uninterrupted. 
Id. 
 206. Id. at 79. 
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Perhaps the most influential case interpreting underwriters’ due 
diligence requirements in modern shelf offerings is In re WorldCom Inc. 
Securities Litigation.207  In WorldCom, the court, after examining 
BarChris and the SEC Releases, held that the lead underwriter, Salomon 
Smith Barney, could not, for purposes of a summary judgment motion, 
prove that it was entitled to a due diligence defense under Section 11.208  
Throughout the opinion, the court favorably cites the SEC Releases, 
including Release No. 7606A, where the SEC explains that in enacting 
Section 11, “Congress “recognized that underwriters occupied a unique 
position that enabled them to discover and compel disclosure of essential 
facts about the offering.”209  According to the Release, “Congress 
believed that subjecting underwriters to the liability provisions would 
provide the necessary incentive to ensure their careful investigation of 
the offering.”210  The court further observed that when “district courts 
have granted summary judgment for underwriters in recent years, the 
underwriters have demonstrated extensive due diligence efforts.”211
The court also dismissed arguments relying on the difficulty of 
discovering certain frauds.
 
212  It explained that, pursuant to the statutory 
framework of Section 11, “an underwriter must conduct a reasonable 
investigation to prevail on the due diligence defense, even if it appears 
that such an investigation would have proven futile . . . .”213  It dismissed 
the argument that, since fraud is difficult to detect, underwriters should 
not even try.214  Pointedly, the court reasoned that without “a reasonable 
investigation, of course, it can never be known what would have been 
uncovered or what additional disclosures would have demanded.”215
The underwriters in WorldCom also argued that their investigation 
would have been duplicative of the auditors’ investigation.
 
216
 
 207. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
  The court, 
however, highlighted an underwriter’s obligation under the prudent man 
standard, and stressed that “underwriters should ask those questions and 
 208. Id. at 634-35. 
 209. Id. at 662 (citing The Regulation of Securities Offerings, SEC Release No. 
7606A, 1998 WL 833389 (Dec. 4, 1998)). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 676. 
 212. Id. at 683–84. 
 213. Id. at 683. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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seek those answers that are appropriate under the circumstances.”217  It 
explained that underwriters “are not being asked to duplicate the work of 
auditors, but to conduct a reasonable investigation.”218
Finally, the court indirectly dismissed the underwriters’ lament 
about the difficulties of conducting due diligence under the time 
pressures of the integrated disclosure system and shelf registrations.
 
219  
It noted that despite changing processes for offerings, “the prudent man 
standard in Section 11 has [not] been diluted . . . [and] the ultimate test 
of reasonable conduct in the specific circumstances of an offering 
remains unchanged.”220
Unfortunately, for purposes of this article, the court did not provide 
specific analysis on the responsibilities of the NMUs.  For purposes of 
the summary judgment motion, “[e]ach of the Underwriter Defendants 
involved in the offering . . . stated that it relied on the due diligence 
 
 
 217. Id. at 684. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 684–85. 
 220. Id. at 685.  To the extent underwriters’ complaints based on time pressures 
have validity; they only apply to shelf offerings.  An eminent authority on civil liability 
in securities cases, Professor Merrit Fox, observes that § 11 liability for misstatements 
is “still fully workable for a new issuer doing an initial public offering.”  Merritt B. Fox, 
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 245 (2009).  Even 
for shelf registrations, several creative workarounds have been suggested to compensate 
for time pressures.  One commentator noted that unlike directors, “underwriters have 
the resources to invest in sophisticated systems in order to adjust their due diligence for 
the rapid nature of shelf offerings.”  David I. Michaels, No Fraud?  No Problem:  
Outside Director Liability for Shelf Offerings Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 339, 379 (2008).  Others, such as Professor Coffee, 
have argued that underwriters could self-insure their § 11 liability for shelf offerings.  
Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 16, at 9.  Beyond academic theorizing, courts in 
Section 11 cases have rejected pleas to circumvent other parts of § 11’s statutory 
language because of changed market conditions and practices.  See e.g., Krim v. 
pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir. 2005).  In denying § 11 standing to 
plaintiffs who argued for acceptance of statistical tracing, Judge Higginbotham noted 
that when “Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 it was not confronted with the 
widespread practice of holding stock in street name.”  Id.  He acknowledged that 
“present market realities, given the fungibility of stock held in street name, may render 
Section 11 ineffective as a practical matter in some aftermarket scenarios.”  Id.  
Nevertheless, he refused to deviate from the statutory language in order to take into 
account changed market realities.  He reasoned that such a deviation would be “an issue 
properly addressed by Congress” and that it was not within the court’s “purview to 
rewrite the statute to take account of changed conditions.”  Id. 
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performed by SSB.”221
B. CASES ADDRESSING NON-MANAGING UNDERWRITERS’ ROLE:  
DON’T JUST SIT THERE 
  Nevertheless, the WorldCom case is instructive 
on the issue of NMUs’ due diligence.  First, obviously, WorldCom 
provides a stark reminder that arguments relying on custom will not 
sway a court to ignore the construct of the statutory scheme of Section 
11.  Similarly, arguments based on the complexity of uncovering fraud 
are not persuasive.  Finally, arguments based on possible duplication of 
efforts or on the difficulties involving time constraints are not 
convincing. 
A handful of cases have addressed, in varying degrees, the role of 
NMUs in relation to the lead.  Some commentators, in reliance on dicta 
in such cases, have asserted that NMUs do not need to investigate or 
supervise their delegate.222
 
 221. In re WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 647. 
  A careful review of the cases, however, 
shows that they should not provide comfort to NMUs who fail to 
supervise the lead. 
 222. One particularly broad overstatement of the cases dealing with NMUs is found 
in an otherwise thoughtful treatise.  See Robert J. Haft, VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL 
BUSINESS FINANCING § 14:7 (2010).  The treatise correctly describes BarChris but then 
incorrectly interprets later cases.  Id.  It provides: 
In BarChris the managing underwriter was thus held bound by its counsel’s 
inadequate investigation, and the other underwriters were held bound by the 
managing underwriter’s consequently inadequate investigation.  (Later court 
decisions have held that all underwriters can obtain the benefits of adequate due 
diligence by the managing underwriter, thus establishing their own due diligence 
defense.) 
Id.  As support for the parenthetical sentence justifying passive NMUs, the authors cite 
two cases:  In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Mich. 1985) 
and In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  Id. at n.4.  As 
described below, neither of those two cases hold that the NMUs’ affirmative defense is 
met automatically when the lead meets its affirmative defense.  In re Consumers Power 
Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583; In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415.  Those 
cases require a more careful read.  In fairness to the authors of the treatise, the footnote 
justifying the parenthetical sentence does include a sentence noting that the SEC would 
require more from NMUs.  VENTURE CAP. & BUS. FIN. § 14:7.  “The SEC has suggested 
that each underwriter must satisfy itself that the lead underwriter’s investigation was 
sufficient.” Id. at n.4; See Obligations of Underwriters, Brokers and Dealers, Securities 
Act Release No. 5275, Spec. Ed. No. 434 (CCH) ¶ 4506B (July 27, 1972). 
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1. Lead Fails/NMU Fails Scenario 
Recall that this article described generally four different due 
diligence relationships between the lead and the NMUs.  On one end of 
the spectrum is the Lead fails/NMU fails scenario.  This scenario refers 
to the situation where the lead underwriter does not meet its affirmative 
due diligence defense and the NMUs did nothing but rely on the lead.  
BarChris is a classic example of just such a scenario.  The BarChris 
court held that in such cases, all the underwriters fail to have a due 
diligence defense.223
In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation (ZZZZ Best II)
 
224 also 
addresses this scenario.  In that case, involving significant fraud, the 
plaintiff investors argued that if the “Defendant NMUs had made even a 
cursory inquiry” into either the issuer or the lead underwriter’s 
investigation, “they would have uncovered serious problems with the Z 
Best public stock offering.”225  In an odd twist that ultimately backfired, 
the defendant NMUs countered that their extreme passivity in the 
fraudulent public offering should exonerate them from both Section 11 
and Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability.226  The NMUs tried to distance 
themselves from the failure of the lead underwriter in uncovering the 
fraud.227  They expressly argued that the “NMUs had only a passive role 
in the Z Best offering and that they had nothing to do with the due 
diligence investigation.”228  The NMUs elaborated that “they completely 
relied on the due diligence investigation (allegedly) performed by [the 
lead], and that such total reliance was justified and ‘customary in the 
industry.’”229
The court was not impressed by the NMUs’ passivity argument for 
purposes of the Section 11 claim.
 
230  It explained that liability “under 
Section 11 is expressly imposed upon ‘every underwriter with respect to 
such security.’”231
 
 223. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 697. 
  The court also noted that the NMU defendants’ 
“names all appeared on the final document disseminated to the 
 224. No. CV-87-3574-RSWL (BX), 1994 WL 746649 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) 
 225. Id. at *1.  The court defined ZZZZ Best as Z Best.  Id. 
 226. Id. at *1-*2. 
 227. Id. at *2. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at *3-*4. 
 231. Id. at *3. 
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public.”232
Perhaps even more interesting, and presumably troubling to passive 
NMUs, is the court’s analysis of the passive NMUs’ exposure in the 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim.
 
233  The court noted that the NMUs 
conceded that they failed to investigate the issuer or the lead 
underwriter’s investigation.234  In light of that extreme passivity, the 
court denied the NMUs’ motion for summary judgment on the Section 
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim.235  The court reasoned that the “NMU 
Defendants’ complete abdication [of] responsibility in investigating 
either Z Best or [the lead underwriter] provides a sufficient ground on 
which to assert a Rule 10b-5 violation” and that at trial, “the parties will 
have to present evidence as to whether it was ‘at least reckless’ for NMU 
Defendants to rely entirely on the due diligence investigation of [the 
lead underwriter].”236
Clearly, BarChris and ZZZZ Best II demonstrate that the Lead 
fails/NMU fails scenario in a Section 11 case is not a novel proposition.  
To the contrary, this is standard due diligence dogma.
 
237  Thus, it is 
somewhat jarring for SIFMA, in its amicus brief in the Refco litigation, 
to suggest a different result should apply when the lead failed and the 
NMUs did nothing.238  No case law supporting the view that NMUs 
could meet their affirmative defense in such a scenario appears to exist.  
Moreover, that position stands contrary to the statutory scheme, the 
legislative history, and SEC guidance.239
 
 232. Id. at *1. 
 
 233. Id. at *8-*9. 
 234. Id. at *8. 
 235. Id. at *9. 
 236. Id. 
 237. “If a court concludes that the lead underwriter conducted an insufficient 
investigation, and the non-managing underwriters did nothing but rely on the lead 
underwriter, the non-managing underwriters will be liable as well.” Jonathan K. 
Youngwood, Conducting Due Diligence in M&A and Securities Offerings 2009: Due 
Diligence as a Defense in Securities Litigation, 1746 PLI/CORP. 57, 68 (2009). 
 238. SIFMA Refco Amicus, supra note 6, at 8. 
 239. The SIFMA amicus is somewhat vague on this point.  It is possible that the 
amicus is only arguing that passive NMUs should automatically succeed whenever the 
lead succeeds in its due diligence burden.  While this position is also incorrect in light 
of the structure of the statute, it is certainly less radical and has some support from dicta 
in certain cases.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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2. Lead Wins/NMU Wins Scenario 
The opposite end of the spectrum is the Lead wins/NMU wins 
scenario. In this scenario, both the lead and the NMU meet their 
respective due diligence burdens.  The lead meets its affirmative defense 
by virtue of its competent investigation.  Admittedly, this investigation, 
while competent enough to establish the lead’s due diligence defense, is 
not actually successful.  If the investigation had been truly successful, 
there would be no material misstatements or omissions in the 
registration statement and the plaintiffs would have no cause of action.  
Nevertheless, in this Lead wins/NMU wins scenario, the lead wins 
because it meets the Section 11(c) standard under the due diligence 
defense and the NMUs win by demonstrating that they meet the 
standard by properly supervising their delegate as allowed by the 
prudent man standard for fiduciary delegation.   
3. Lead Fails/NMU Wins Scenario 
The remaining two relationships between lead underwriters and 
NMUs require more analysis.  The two remaining scenarios arise when 
the due diligence activities of the lead and the NMU are no longer in 
concert. One such scenario is the Lead fails/NMU wins.  In these cases, 
the lead fails to meet its due diligence burden, but the NMUs are able to 
prove that they appropriately questioned the lead’s investigation. 
Notably, this scenario is not just theoretical and may well arise in 
various situations.  It could arise, for example, when there is collusion 
between the lead and the issuer, perhaps because of significant ongoing 
relationships.  It could also arise because of misplaced faith by the lead 
on the issuer.  Either way, the lead could intentionally, or negligently, 
misrepresent to the NMUs the thoroughness of its actual investigation of 
the issuer. 
This article demonstrates, through analysis of the prudent man 
duties regarding delegation, that the lead’s failure in such cases need not 
be the NMUs’ failure.  Rather, the NMUs should be protected as long as 
they demonstrate that they monitored the lead’s investigation.  Trust law 
would exonerate a trustee who properly attempted to supervise his 
delegate even when the delegate spectacularly failed.  Similarly, NMUs 
who properly supervised the lead should be able to meet their due 
diligence defense even when the lead fails. 
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The court in In re Activision Securities Litigation240 discussed the 
relationship of lead and NMUs when addressing the plaintiffs’ motion to 
certify the class of defendant underwriters in a Section 11 action.241  The 
Activision court recognized that the NMUs might be able to protect 
themselves in such cases even when the lead fails to establish its 
affirmative defense.242  Activision was in the business of designing, 
manufacturing, and marketing video game cartridges that were 
compatible with Atari 2600 and Mattel Electronics Intellivision 
systems.243  The company had been successful in its early years.244  
However, shortly after its initial public offering, the company revealed a 
large pre-tax loss and its stock price plummeted.245  The investor 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew at the time of the initial 
public offering that the company was experiencing financial difficulties 
and losing market share but that the defendants did not disclose that 
information in the registration statement.246  The investor plaintiffs made 
several motions, including one to certify the defendant underwriters as a 
class.247  The underwriters, trying to prevent defendant class 
certification, argued that the due diligence defense of the lead 
underwriters was different from the due diligence defense of the other 
participating underwriters in the syndicate.248
The court held that underwriter class certification was appropriate 
in the given case, reasoning that, in many respects, the various 
underwriters’ interests were aligned.
 
249  It explained that the 
underwriters, as a group, share certain defenses in Section 11 cases.250  
For example, all underwriters share the defense that the registration 
statement did not contain a material misstatement or omission.251
 
 240. 621 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
  If the 
lack of materiality argument succeeds, the investors would not meet 
their burden of showing a defective registration statement and their 
 241. Id. at 433. 
 242. Id. at 434. 
 243. Id. at 418. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 418–19. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 419. 
 248. Id. at 434. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 433. 
 251. Id. 
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Section 11 action would fall.  Also, all the underwriters share the 
defense that the investors purchased their shares in the offering with 
prior knowledge of the misrepresentations or omissions.252
Finally, and most importantly for purposes of this analysis, the 
court noted that the underwriter defendants share the due diligence 
defense.
  If the prior 
knowledge defense succeeds as to all the plaintiff investors, it too would 
end the action against all the underwriters. 
253  Here, however, the court recognized that the various 
underwriters’ interests could diverge.254  The court expressly recognized 
that the underwriting firms’ interests diverge when the lead fails to meet 
its burden of proving its own due diligence.255  While the court 
ultimately granted certification of the defendant underwriter class, it 
recognized that if the lead failed to prove its due diligence defense, the 
court might have to bifurcate the trial at that point to allow the non-lead 
underwriting firms to demonstrate their own investigation or supervision 
of the lead.256  Thus, the court clearly recognized the possibility of a lead 
fails/NMU wins scenario, in which the separate due diligence activities, 
or appropriate monitoring of the lead, by the NMUs becomes 
significant.257
Similarly, in In re Computer Memories Securities Litigation,
 
258 the 
underwriters, trying to prevent class certification, posited that the due 
diligence defense of the lead differs from the due diligence defense of 
the NMUs in the syndicate.259  The lead underwriters argued that the 
underwriter class should not be certified “because each underwriter will 
have an individual due diligence defense based on whether the particular 
underwriter, given its role in the offering, satisfied its due diligence 
obligation.”260
 
 252. Id. 
  The court adopted the reasoning of the court in 
Activision.  Thus, it granted the underwriter class certification, yet 
recognized that if the lead failed to prove its due diligence defense, the 
court might have to bifurcate the trial to allow the non-lead firms to 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 434. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. 111 F.R.D. 675 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
 259. Id. at 687. 
 260. Id. 
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demonstrate their own due diligence defense.261
4. Lead Wins/NMU Fails Scenario 
 
The final scenario is the one referred to here as Lead wins/NMU 
fails.  This scenario arises when the lead is able to meet its due diligence 
burden, but the NMU did not attempt to supervise or question the lead’s 
investigation.  This is the scenario expressly left unresolved in 
BarChris.262  While some commentators suggest that the NMU 
automatically wins when the lead wins, the statutory scheme, based on 
the prudent man analysis, does not support that result.  It appears that 
confusion on this issue arises in part from dicta in In re Gap.263 One 
commentator discussing the underwriters’ defense in In re Gap relies on 
the case to conclude that “[s]hould the managing underwriter sustain a 
due diligence defense, all underwriters in the syndicate would escape 
liability.”264
The court in Gap, much like the court in Activision, faced the 
procedural question of whether to certify the class of defendant 
underwriters.
  However, a careful reading of Gap reveals that 
commentators may be relying too heavily on the case. 
265  Before deciding whether certification was proper, the 
court observed that the substantive questions of “[w]hether participating 
and lead underwriters will be held to the same standard of care and 
whether participating underwriters may delegate any or all of their 
investigatory responsibility to the lead underwriters” are open 
questions.266
One view, according to the court, is that proposed by Professor 
Folk in a 1969 law review article examining Section 11 after 
  In determining whether to certify the underwriting class, it 
explained that there are two slightly differing views on NMUs’ 
responsibilities in relation to the lead’s investigation. 
 
 261. Id. at 687-88. 
 262. Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp, 283 F. Supp. 643, n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  (“In 
view of this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the underwriters 
other than [the lead] would have been protected if [the lead] had established that as lead 
underwriter, it made a reasonable investigation.”). 
 263. In re Gap Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
 264. William J. Whelan, III, Securities Offerings 2009:  What Counsel Need to 
Know to Get Deals Done in Challenging Markets, 1734 PLI/CORP. 635, 644 (2009). 
 265. In re Gap Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. at 288. 
 266. Id. at 300. 
2011] NON-MANAGING UNDERWRITERS’  371 
ROLE IN SECURITIES OFFERINGS 
 
BarChris.267  The court notes that “Professor Folk argues on the basis of 
industry practice and public policy, that the cornerstone of due diligence 
lies in the activities of lead underwriter; therefore, participating 
underwriters should be allowed to delegate to the lead their investigatory 
responsibilities.”268  Another view, the court explains, is that held by the 
SEC, which espouses a “double-checking role” for participating 
underwriters. 269  The court compared the two views and determined that 
“Professor Folk would extend the benefit of the manager’s due diligence 
to the participants no matter what they had done, whereas the 
Commission, theoretically, might penalize the participant who failed to 
double check the diligent manager’s methods.”270  The court appears to 
prefer Professor Folk’s argument as the more practical one and, in 
deciding to certify the underwriters class, stated that “proof of the due 
diligence of the managing underwriter will most likely exonerate the 
participants as well.”271
Accordingly, while Gap provides some modicum of support for the 
proposition that when the lead wins the NMU automatically wins, it is 
based on practical considerations and academic arguments.  The 
statutory scheme, however, does not support this reading.  Rather, it 
requires supervision of the delegate.  Thus, the better proposition is that 
NMUs should supervise their delegates. 
 
 
VI.  PRACTICAL ISSUES, CONFLICTS AND CONCLUSION 
The foregoing provides both good news and bad news for NMUs.  
The good news is that under the statutory scheme, NMUs who properly 
monitor the lead’s due diligence investigation can protect themselves 
from liability even when the lead fails to establish its own due diligence 
defense.  Thus, NMUs do not have to be at the mercy of the lead.  The 
bad news is that, in order to protect their separate affirmative defense, 
NMUs must actually supervise the lead’s due diligence investigation.272
 
 267. Id. at 299 n.19. 
  
 268. Id. at 300. 
 269. Id. at 301. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 302 (emphasis added). 
 272. This bad news is tempered, however, by a recognition that due diligence is an 
affirmative defense and not an affirmative duty.  Thus, NMUs could, in particular 
offerings, make business decisions to forgo their ability to supervise the lead and give 
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Writing shortly after the WorldCom due diligence decision, one noted 
securities attorney commented on this risk for NMUs: 
Until WorldCom, non-lead members of the underwriting syndicate 
did not participate in diligence and simply relied on the diligence 
performed by the lead.  Going forward, the non-lead who remains at 
a double remove from the investigation—relying on the lead, who 
relies on the auditor—has a double risk of losing its diligence 
defense. If the teaching of WorldCom is that leads may not rely 
blindly on auditors, then a fortiori non-leads may not rely blindly on 
leads.273
What guidance is available for NMUs who wish to maintain their 
ability to raise a separate due diligence defense? First, how much 
monitoring of the lead suffices to meet the fiduciary delegation 
standard?  The traditional answer is that, as with any due diligence issue, 
the reasonableness of the supervision of the investigation depends on the 
particular facts regarding the issuer, the offering, and the role of the 
defendant in the offering.  Second, how should NMUs determine the 
quality of the lead’s investigation?  It is helpful to recall that 
underwriting firms generally know how to conduct full blown due 
diligence investigations.  Accordingly, they should, in turn, know which 
questions to ask the lead in order to assess the thoroughness of the lead’s 
investigation.  Moreover, lead underwriters routinely delegate some due 
diligence to auditors, attorneys, and others.  Thus, supervision of 
delegates is not new to the investment banking community.  The steps 
taken to supervise those third parties can be modified as needed in this 
context.  Finally, sophisticated trustees have long known how to 
supervise myriad institutional delegates.  Lessons from trustee 
delegation can be applied to supervision issues within underwriting 
syndicates. 
 
Determining which questions to ask the lead, which NMUs’ 
specialties and expertise should be tapped for particular facets of the 
investigation, and how to ask the questions is relatively easy.  The harder 
questions remain.  Are the current systems rigged so as to prevent 
NMUs from effectively monitoring the lead?  Are there conflicts of 
 
up their ability to raise their separate § 11 defenses. 
 273. Gideon A. Schor, The Due Diligence and Reliance Defenses in WorldCom:  
Retrospect and Prospect at *9 (2006), available at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/ 
Due_Diligence_after_WorldCom.pdf. 
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interests and unequal bargaining power between the lead and NMUs that 
hamper such monitoring? 
Conflicts between the lead and the NMUs do exist but they should 
be managable by NMUs who wish to preserve their separate defense.  In 
difficult economic times, might a lead underwriter agree to an easier and 
quicker due diligence investigation of a significant client’s registered 
offering in order to maintain an ongoing client relationship?  Would 
such a potentially compromised lead underwriter attempt to block 
questions from NMUs?  The response by NMUs is to ensure that they 
remain vigilant.  One commentator notes that because the lead is only 
liable for the amount of securities that it underwrote under section 11(e) 
and not for those of the other underwriters, the lead might make a 
judgment call that would allow in more misstatements, balancing only 
its own potential liability if a lawsuit ensues, and not the full liability of 
all the NMUs.274  Similarly, an argument can be made that because 
NMUs are only responsible for the amount they underwrote, they do not 
have a tremendous incentive to expend sums on monitoring the lead.  
These arguments, however, do not take into account the significant 
monetary risks of covering one’s underwriting.  Thus, although these are 
interesting theoretical concerns, they are not terribly troubling.275
In some instances, attorney conflicts could become intertwined with 
the lead and NMU relationship.  Generally, once the lead underwriter 
invites the NMUs to participate in the offering, counsel for the lead 
underwriter also becomes counsel for the NMUs.
 
276
 
 274. Dana B. Klinges, Expanding the Liability of Managing Underwriters Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1067-70 (1985). 
  To the extent the 
lead delegates some or all of the legal part of the due diligence to its 
counsel, a potential conflict arises.  In that case, the lead’s counsel 
 275. Another commentator notes conflicts between the lead and the NMUs because 
of § 11(f).  J. William Hicks, Misleading Registration Statements:  Section 11, 17 CIVIL 
LIABILITIES:  ENFORCEMENT AND LITIG. § 4:52 (2009).  The argument is that § 11(f)(1) 
“denies a right of contribution to any underwriter found guilty of fraud” thus non-
managing underwriters would “benefit from a finding that the lead underwriter 
defrauded them”  Id. at 1.  The lead underwriter would want to avoid such as finding.  
Thus, the argument is that the “lead underwriter lacks any incentive as class 
representative to investigate its own fraudulent misrepresentations and might even settle 
to the case quickly to conceal self-incriminating information.”  Id. 
 276. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  The court observed that the SEC “noted the increased designation of one law 
firm to act as underwriters’ counsel.”  Id. 
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would be conducting the legal part of the due diligence.277  Lead 
underwriter’s counsel certainly would not be in a position to supervise 
the quality of its own investigation.  Sorting out these possible 
intertwined layers is interesting, but is not the focus of this article.  
Potential conflicts can generally be waived and this article is not 
suggesting that each NMU hire its own counsel.278  Moreover, this 
article is not suggesting that the NMUs engage in supervision that delays 
the offering process.  Recently, very creative solutions have been 
suggested for underwriters to accomplish their due diligence role 
effectively and efficiently even when they are under significant time 
pressures.279
In sum, in order to establish an affirmative defense under Section 
11, a NMU must supervise the lead underwriter’s investigation.  This 
article recommends that NMUs pick up their game and perform 
targeted and thoughtful monitoring of the lead’s due diligence 
investigation.  Such targeted questioning could actually serve to find a 
problem and, in turn, save the NMUs, the lead, and perhaps even the 
investors. 
  Those same ideas could easily be adopted for NMUs’ 
targeted monitoring of the lead’s investigation. 
 
 
 277. One expert on underwriter due diligence explains that generally the 
“components of due diligence include: background due diligence, business due 
diligence, financial due diligence, MD&A due diligence, legal due diligence, 
accounting due diligence, backup review, corporate governance/Sarbanes-Oxley due 
diligence, and audit committee due diligence.”  Valerie Ford Jacob, Conducting Due 
Diligence in M&A and Securities Offerings 2008: The Due Diligence Process from the 
Underwriter’s Perspective, 1678 PLI/CORP. 89, at *97–*98 (2008).  Legal due 
diligence, in turn, involves review of such things as reports to management from 
accountants, stockholder agreements, loan agreements, material business contracts, 
employment agreements, and outstanding litigation. Id. at *102–*03. 
 278. The purpose of this article is certainly not to create a jobs bill for securities 
attorneys. On the other hand, is it possible that fresh eyes from another law firm 
questioning the work of lead underwriter’s counsel could spot a problem? 
 279. See e.g., Leahy, supra note 2, at 2053-57 (discussing among other options 
“client relationship teams” for effective “continuous due diligence”). 
